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This article situates QBism among other well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics.
QBism has its roots in personalist Bayesian probability theory, is crucially dependent upon the
tools of quantum information, and in latest developments has set out to investigate whether the
physical world might be of a type sketched in the philosophies of pragmatism, pluralism, nonre-
ductionism, and meliorism. Beyond conceptual issues, the technical side of QBism is focused on
the mathematically hard problem of finding a good representation of quantum mechanics purely in
terms of probabilities, without amplitudes or Hilbert-space operators. The best candidate repre-
sentation involves an entity called a symmetric informationally complete quantum measurement,
or SIC. Contemplation of it gives a way to think of the Born rule as an addition to the rules of
probability theory, applicable when an agent considers gambling on the consequences of her actions
on the external world, duly taking into account a new universal capacity: namely, Hilbert-space
dimension. The article ends by showing that the egocentric elements in QBism represent no imped-
iment to pursuing quantum cosmology and even open up possibilities never dreamt of in the usual
formulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chauncey Wright a nearly forgotten philosopher of
real merit, taught me when young that I must not
say necessary about the universe, that we don’t
know whether anything is necessary or not. So I
describe myself as a bettabilitarian. I believe that
we can bet on the behavior of the universe in its
contact with us. [Our underlining; his italics.]
— Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Quantum physics works. But why?
The mathematical apparatus which we heft onto
physics students is astonishingly successful. It guides our
understanding of phenomena from the submicroscopic
clustering of quarks to the spectra of quasars, and it un-
derpins technological advances that perfuse throughout
our lives. But when we take a moment and ask—whether
in a dorm room or the pages of a philosophy journal—
what the theory is all about, we find ourselves thrashing
about in decades of accumulated murk. How much of
the mathematical gadgetry is human convention and his-
torical happenstance, and how much of it truly indicates
the character of the natural world that was here before
we were and would endure in our absence? Can we take
discourse about observership and agency, about what it
means to be an agent whose actions have consequences,
about the relation between truth and what works in prac-
tice, and make honest mathematics of it?
According to the research program of QBism [1–13],
the answer is wholeheartedly Yes. On one hand, QBism
is a way of investing meaning in the abstract structure of
quantum theory: It tells us that quantum theory is fun-
damentally about agency, actions, consequences and ex-
pectations. On the other, QBism points out the virtue of
reconstructing quantum theory from deep, physical prin-
ciples. Of all the ideas and theorems that look important,
which are the ideas, the captivating and compelling seed
from which all the formulae would grow given only careful
thinking?
We can illustrate the trouble with quantum mechanics
by comparing it with other areas of physics in which we
have collectively honed our understanding to a high de-
gree of sophistication. Two examples that come to mind
are the science of thermodynamics and the special the-
ory of relativity. An old joke has it that the three laws of
thermodynamics are “You can’t win,” “You can’t break
even,” and “You can’t get out of the game.” To these, we
ought to prepend the zeroth law, which we could state as,
“At least the scoring is fair.” But consider the premise
of the joke, which is really rather remarkable: There are
laws of thermodynamics—a concise list of deep physical
principles that underlie and nourish the entire subject.
Likewise for special relativity: Inertial observers Alice
and Bob can come to agree on the laws of physics, but
no experiment they could ever do can establish that one
is “really moving” and the other “really standing still”—
not even measuring the speed of light. We invest a little
mathematics, and then close and careful consideration of
these basic principles yields all the details of the formal
apparatus, with its nasty square roots or intermingling
partial derivatives.
This level of understanding brings many advantages.
Having the deep principles set out in explicit form points
out how to test a theory in the most direct manner.
Moreover, it greatly aids us when we teach the theory.
We do not have to slog through all the confusions that
bedeviled the physicists who first developed the subject,
to say nothing of the extra confusions created by the fact
that “historical” pedagogy is almost inevitably a carica-
ture. In addition, a principled understanding helps us
apply a theory. As we work our way into a detailed cal-
culation, we can cross-check against the basic postulates.
Does our calculation imply that signals travel faster than
light? Does our seventeenth equation imply that entropy
is flowing the wrong way? We must have made an error!
And, when we found our theory upon its deep princi-
ples, we have a guide for extending our theory, because
we know what properties must obtain in order for a new,
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2more general theory to reduce to our old one in a special
case.
To our great distress, we must admit that in the matter
of quantum mechanics, the physics profession lacks this
level of understanding.
Instead, we have a mathematical apparatus and day-
to-day experience on how to apply it successfully. But
the deep principles remain elusive. What we have in their
place is almost a century of “interpretations” cooked up
for the theory—campfire stories told to give meaning to
the mathematics and say what it is “all about.” And
what a host of tales have there been!
• Copenhagen Interpretations – Bohr, Heisenberg,
Pauli, von Weizsa¨cker, Peierls, Wheeler (they’re
actually all different!)
• Nonlocal Hidden Variables – de Broglie, Bohm,
Bub (early on), Maudlin, Goldstein, Valentini,
Norsen, Hardy
• Stochastic Mechanics – Nelson, Smolin (Lee)
• Modal Interpretations – Kochen, Dieks, van
Fraassen, Bub (later on), Healey (for a time),
Spekkens & Sipe (briefly)
• Quantum Logics – Birkhoff & von Neumann,
Mackey, Jauch, Piron, Finkelstein, Putnam
• Consciousness-Induced Collapse Theories –
Wigner, von Neumann
• Objective Collapse Models –
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, Pearl, Penrose, Frigg,
Gisin, Tumulka, Albert
• Consistent Histories – Griffiths, Omne`s
• Transactional Interpretation – Cramer, Kastner
• Relational Interpretations – Rovelli, Spekkens
(TBA)
• Ensemble Interpretation – Einstein (?), Ballentine
• Informational Interpretations – Zeilinger,
Brukner, Bub (presently)
• Superdeterminism – Bell (as a joke), ’t Hooft (in
full seriousness)
• Many-Worlds Interpretations – Everett, Albert &
Loewer, Barbour, Coleman, Deutsch (early
version), Deutsch (later version), DeWitt,
Gell-Mann & Hartle, Geroch, Graham, Greaves,
Lockwood, Papineau, Saunders, Smolin (John),
Tegmark, Vaidman, Wallace, Zurek . . .
This list is far from exhaustive, and as already hinted
abundantly, two authors listed under the same bullet may
well disagree on significant issues.1
It is often said that “all interpretations of quantum
mechanics make the same predictions, so we cannot tell
them apart by experiment.” This is false for at least
two reasons, a small one and a big one. The small point
is that some ideas classified among the “interpretations”
are deliberately fashioned to depart from quantum the-
ory in some way. Objective Collapse models are the chief
examples of this. But more importantly, it is not clear
that all of the interpretations can be made to yield predic-
tions at all, when they are thought upon with adequate
stringency.
We should also mention the attitude that there is no
point to “interpreting” quantum theory, because quan-
tum theory will turn out to be wrong anyway. Perhaps
the reason why we have yet to fit quantum physics to-
gether with gravity is that the quantum side is funda-
mentally defective, in some fashion that has only mani-
fested when we put the full weight of general relativity
upon it. (Feynman even speculated that gravity itself
could be the result of quantum mechanics breaking down,
in which case “quantizing gravity” would be meaning-
less [14].) Fair enough! But how, then, do we modify
quantum theory in such a way that it still works in all
the many places it has worked so far?
So the field of quantum foundations is not unfounded;
it is absolutely vital to physics as a whole. But what con-
stitutes “progress” in quantum foundations? How would
one know progress if one saw it? Through the years, it
seems the most popular strategy has been to remove the
observer from the theory just as quickly as possible, and
with surgical precision. In practice this has generally
meant to keep the mathematical structure of quantum
theory as it stands (complex Hilbert spaces, operators,
tensor products, etc.), but, by hook or crook, find a way
to tell a story about the mathematical symbols that in-
volves no observers at all.
In short, the strategy has been to reify or objectify
all the mathematical symbols of the theory and then ex-
plore whatever comes of the move. All the various in-
terpretations that result see quantum states as physical
entities, like a blob of ψ-flavored gelatin, sliding about
in accord with its own dynamical laws. Three exam-
ples suffice to give a feel: In the de Broglie–Bohm “pilot
wave” version of quantum theory, there are no funda-
mental measurements, only “particles” flying around in
a 3N -dimensional configuration space, pushed around by
a wave function regarded as a real physical field in that
space. In “spontaneous collapse” versions, systems are
endowed with quantum states that generally evolve uni-
1 Over the years, the many-worlders in particular have done a
remarkably poor job of agreeing with one another about what
specifically there are supposed to be many of.
3tarily, but from time-to-time collapse without any need
for measurement. In Everettian or “many-worlds” quan-
tum mechanics, it is only the world as a whole—they
call it a multiverse—that is really endowed with an in-
trinsic quantum state, and that quantum state evolves
deterministically, with only an illusion from the inside of
probabilistic “branching.”
The trouble with all these interpretations as quick fixes
for quantum strangeness is that they look to be just that,
really quick fixes. They look to be interpretive strategies
hardly compelled by the particular details of the quan-
tum formalism, giving only more or less arbitrary ap-
pendages to it. This already explains in part why we
have been able to exhibit three such different strategies,
but it is worse: Each of these strategies gives rise to its
own set of tough-to-swallow ideas. Pilot-wave theories,
for instance, give instantaneous action at a distance, but
not actions that can be harnessed to send detectable sig-
nals. If so, then what a delicately balanced high-wire act
nature presents us with. And how much appeal does
the idea of waves pushing particles about really have
when it turns out that, in order to be consistent, “po-
sition measurements” don’t really measure particle posi-
tions [15]? Or take the Everettians. Their world purports
to have no observers, but then it has no probabilities ei-
ther. What are we then to do with the Born rule for
calculating quantum probabilities? Throw it away and
say it never mattered? It is true that quite an effort
has been made by the Everettians to rederive the rule
by one means or another. But these attempts may have
re-imported at least as much vagueness as they claim
to eliminate [16–20]. To many in the outside world, it
looks like the success of these derivations depends upon
where they are assessed—for instance, whether in Oxford
[21, 22] or Cambridge [23, 24].
QBists hold that the way forward is to own up to the
following lesson. Before there were people using quantum
theory as a branch of physics, before they were calculating
neutron-capture cross-sections for uranium and working
on all the other practical problems the theory suggests,
there were no quantum states. The world may be full of
stuff and things of all kinds, but among all the stuff and
all the things, there is no unique, observer-independent,
quantum-state kind of stuff.
The immediate payoff of this strategy is that it elimi-
nates the conundrums arising in the various objectified-
state interpretations. A paraphrase of a quote by James
Hartle makes the point decisively [25]:
A quantum-mechanical state being a sum-
mary of the observers’ information about an
individual physical system changes both by
dynamical laws, and whenever the observer
acquires new information about the system
through the process of measurement. The ex-
istence of two laws for the evolution of the
state vector becomes problematical only if it
is believed that the state vector is an objec-
tive property of the system. If, however, the
state of a system is defined as a list of [ex-
perimental] propositions together with their
[probabilities of occurrence], it is not sur-
prising that after a measurement the state
must be changed to be in accord with [any]
new information. The “reduction of the wave
packet” does take place in the consciousness
of the observer, not because of any unique
physical process which takes place there, but
only because the state is a construct of the
observer and not an objective property of the
physical system.
The objective quantum state is the latter-day equiv-
alent of the luminiferous æther. But recognizing this is
only the first step of an adventure. Luckily the days for
this expedition are ripe, thanks in large part to the devel-
opment of the field of quantum information theory in the
last 25 years—that is, the multidisciplinary field that has
brought about quantum cryptography, quantum telepor-
tation, and will one day bring about full-blown quantum
computation. Terminology can say it all: A practitioner
in this field, whether she has ever thought an ounce about
quantum foundations, is just as likely to say “quantum
information” as “quantum state” when talking of any |ψ〉.
“What does the quantum teleportation protocol do?” A
now completely standard answer is: “It transfers quan-
tum information from Alice’s site to Bob’s.” What we
have here is a change of mindset [6].
What the facts and figures, protocols and theorems
of quantum information pound home is the idea that
quantum states look, act, and feel like information in the
technical sense of the word—the sense provided by prob-
ability theory and Shannon’s information theory. There
is no more beautiful demonstration of this than Robert
Spekkens’s “toy model” for mimicking various features of
quantum mechanics [26]. In that model, the “toys” are
each equipped with four possible mechanical configura-
tions; but the players, the manipulators of the toys, are
consistently impeded from having more than one bit of
information about each toy’s actual configuration. (Or
a total of two bits for each two toys, three bits for each
three toys, and so on.) The only things the players can
know are their own states of uncertainty about the con-
figurations. The wonderful thing is that these states of
uncertainty exhibit many of the characteristics of quan-
tum information: from the no-cloning theorem to ana-
logues of quantum teleportation, quantum key distribu-
tion, entanglement monogamy, and even interference in
a Mach–Zehnder interferometer. More than two dozen
quantum phenomena are reproduced qualitatively, and all
the while one can always pinpoint the underlying cause
of this: The phenomena arise in the uncertainties, never
in the mechanical configurations. It is the states of un-
certainty that mimic the formal apparatus of quantum
theory, not the toys’ so-called ontic states (states of re-
ality).
4What considerations like this tell the ψ-ontologists2—
i.e., those who to attempt to remove the observer
too quickly from quantum mechanics by giving quan-
tum states an unfounded ontic status—was well put by
Spekkens:
[A] proponent of the ontic view might argue
that the phenomena in question are not mys-
terious if one abandons certain preconceived
notions about physical reality. The challenge
we offer to such a person is to present a
few simple physical principles by the light of
which all of these phenomena become concep-
tually intuitive (and not merely mathemati-
cal consequences of the formalism) within a
framework wherein the quantum state is an
ontic state. Our impression is that this chal-
lenge cannot be met. By contrast, a sin-
gle information-theoretic principle, which im-
poses a constraint on the amount of knowl-
edge one can have about any system, is suffi-
cient to derive all of these phenomena in the
context of a simple toy theory . . .
The point is, far from being an appendage cheaply tacked
on to the theory, the idea of quantum states as informa-
tion has a simple unifying power that goes some way
toward explaining why the theory has the very mathe-
matical structure it does.3 By contrast, who could take
the many-worlds idea and derive any of the structure of
quantum theory out of it? This would be a bit like try-
ing to regrow a lizard from the tip of its chopped-off tail:
The Everettian conception never purported to be more
than a reaction to the formalism in the first place.
But there are still deep puzzles left outstanding. Above
all, there are the old questions of Whose information?
and Information about what?—these certainly must be
addressed before any resolution of the quantum mysteries
can be declared a success. It must also be settled whether
quantum theory is obligated to give a criterion for what
counts as an observer. Finally, because no one wants
to give up on physics, we must tackle head-on the most
crucial question of all: If quantum states are not part of
the stuff of the world, then what is? What sort of stuff
does quantum mechanics say the world is made of?
2 This beautiful word, not to be confused with a practitioner of
Scientology, was coined by Christopher Granade [27].
3 We say “goes some way toward” because, though the toy model
makes about as compelling a case as we have ever seen that
quantum states are states of information (an extremely valuable
step forward), it gravely departs from quantum theory in other
aspects. For instance, by its nature, it can give no Bell inequality
violations or analogues of the Kochen–Specker noncolorability
theorems. Later sections of this paper will indicate that the
cause of the deficit is that the toy model differs crucially from
quantum theory in its answer to the question Information about
what?
An understanding of the quantum, like all things worth
having, will not come easily. But this much is sure: The
glaringly obvious (that a large part of quantum theory,
the central part in fact, is about information) should not
be abandoned rashly. To do so is to lose grip of the
theory as it is applied in practice, with no better grasp
of reality in return. If on the other hand, one holds fast to
the central point about information, initially frightening
though it may be, one may still be able to reconstruct a
picture of reality from the unfocused edge of one’s vision.
Often the best stories come from there anyway.
FIG. 1: “May not the creatia of a quantum observer’s actions
likewise be such additions to the universe as to enhance its
total value? And on this view, is not the QBist quantum
observer—the agent—a kind of superhero for the universe as
a whole, making extra things happen wherever, whenever he
is called to duty?” (Drawing courtesy of Mark Staff Brandl.)
So, what is the overarching story of QBism, and what
does the QB stand for anyway? The Q clearly stands
for Quantum, but the B? Initially, we had taken the B
to stand for Bayesian, the interpretation of probability
from which our efforts grew. This is reflected in much
of the literature on the subject—see, for instance, the ti-
tle of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on
QBism [13]. However, QBists eventually became dissat-
isfied with this meaning for the B, as there are just too
many varieties of Bayesianism [28]—QBism only repre-
sents one very specific strain of it [11]. So, for a time we
would say jokingly that the B rather stands for Bruno de
Finetti, our hero in probability theory. But eventually
5and with good reason, we landed on the idea of B for Bet-
tabilitarian! This rolling word, coined by U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., seemed to cap-
ture QBism perfectly. Author Louis Menand, in his mag-
isterial book The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in
America [29], put it like this:
‘The loss of certainty’ is a phrase many intel-
lectual historians have used the characterize
the period in which Holmes lived. But the
phrase has it backward. It was not the loss of
certainty that stimulated the late-nineteenth-
century thinkers with whom Holmes asso-
ciated; it was the discovery of uncertainty.
Holmes was, in many respects, a materialist.
He believed, as he put it, that “the law of
the grub . . . is also the law for man.” And
concerning the hope of social betterment, he
was something worse than a pessimist. “I de-
spise,” he said, “the upward and onward.”
But he was not entirely a determinist, be-
cause he did not think that the course of hu-
man events was fixed . . . . Complete certainty
was an illusion; of that he was certain. There
were only greater and lesser degrees of cer-
tainty, and that was enough. It was, in fact,
better than enough; for although we always
want to reduce the degree of uncertainty in
our lives, we never want it to disappear en-
tirely, since uncertainty is what puts the play
in the joints. Imprecision, the sportiveness,
as it were, of the quantum, is what makes life
interesting and change possible. Holmes liked
to call himself a “bettabilitarian”: we cannot
know what consequences the universe will at-
tach to our choices, but we can bet on them,
and we do it every day.
And that is it—that is QBism! To be a QBist is to use
quantum theory to be a “better bettabilitarian” in this
world in which we are all immersed and which we shape
with our every action.
Let us unroll this big idea.
II. EXACTLY HOW QUANTUM STATES FAIL
TO EXIST
An experimental physicist usually says that an “ex-
perimentally determined” probability has an “er-
ror,” and writes P (H) = NH/N ± 1/2
√
N . There
is an implication in such an expression that there
is a “true” or “correct” probability which could be
computed if we knew enough, and that the observa-
tion may be in “error” due to a fluctuation. There
is, however, no way to make such thinking logically
consistent. It is probably better to realize that the
probability concept is in a sense subjective, that it
is always based on uncertain knowledge, and that
its quantitative evaluation is subject to change as
we obtain more information.
— Richard P. Feynman
The Feynman Lectures on Physics
Every area of human endeavor has its bold extremes.
Ones that say, “If this is going to be done right, we must
go this far. Nothing less will do.” In probability theory,
the bold extreme is the personalist Bayesian account of
probability [30]. It says that probability theory is of the
character of formal logic—a set of criteria for testing con-
sistency. In the case of formal logic, the consistency is
between truth values of propositions. However logic itself
does not have the power to set the truth values it manip-
ulates. It can only say if various truth values are consis-
tent or inconsistent; the actual values come from another
source. Whenever logic reveals a set of truth values to be
inconsistent, one must dip back into the source to find a
way to alleviate the discord. But precisely in which way
to alleviate it, logic gives no guidance. “Is the truth value
for this one isolated proposition correct?” Logic itself is
powerless to say.
The key idea of personalist Bayesian probability the-
ory is that it too is a calculus of consistency (or “coher-
ence” as the practitioners call it), but this time for one’s
decision-making degrees of belief. Probability theory can
only say if various degrees of belief are consistent or in-
consistent with each other. The actual beliefs come from
another source, and there is nowhere to pin their respon-
sibility but on the agent who holds them. Dennis Lindley
put it nicely in his book Understanding Uncertainty [31]:
The Bayesian, subjectivist, or coherent, para-
digm is egocentric. It is a tale of one person
contemplating the world and not wishing to
be stupid (technically, incoherent). He real-
izes that to do this his statements of uncer-
tainty must be probabilistic.
A probability assignment is a tool an agent uses to make
gambles and decisions—it is a tool she uses for navigat-
ing life and responding to her environment. Probability
theory as a whole, on the other hand, is not about a
single isolated belief, but about a whole mesh of them.
When a belief in the mesh is found to be incoherent with
the others, the theory flags the inconsistency. However,
it gives no guidance for how to mend any incoherences
6it finds. To alleviate the discord, one can only dip back
into the source of the assignments—specifically, the agent
who attempted to sum up all her history, experience, and
expectations with those assignments in the first place.
This is the reason for the terminology that a probability
is a “degree of belief” rather than a “degree of truth” or
“degree of facticity.”
To give an example of how mere internal consistency
can yield the mathematical rules of probability is to
quantify the consequences of acting upon beliefs in terms
of costs and benefits. An agent, whom we can call Alice,
does business with a bookie, whose goal is to profit by
exposing inconsistencies in Alice’s mesh of beliefs. Al-
ice’s goal is to avoid gambling in a way that forces her
into a sure loss. The bookie buys and sells lottery tickets
of the form
Worth $1 if the event E occurs. (1)
Based on her own expectations about the event E, Alice
assigns a number p(E), which is the price in dollars at
which she is willing to buy or to sell a lottery ticket of
this form. The normative rule that Alice should avoid
a sure loss implies bounds on p(E): If p(E) < 0, then
Alice would be willing to pay money to have the bookie
take the ticket off her hands, whereas if p(E) > 1, she
would be willing to pay more for a ticket than it could
ever be worth. Furthermore, consider two events E and
F , which Alice believes to be mutually exclusive. Alice
must strive for consistency in her pricing for the following
three tickets. First,
Worth $1 if E. (2)
Second,
Worth $1 if F . (3)
And finally,
Worth $1 if E or F . (4)
The value of the third ticket should be the sum total
value of the first two. If Alice sets her prices such that
p(E or F ) > p(E)+p(F ), then the bookie can have a set
of transactions that lead her into a sure loss. In the jar-
gon, Alice is vulnerable to a “Dutch book”: The bookie
sells Alice the third ticket and buys the first two, leaving
Alice in debt. Whichever event happens, Alice cannot
recoup the loss. Likewise, the bookie can lead Alice into
a sure loss if Alice chooses p(E or F ) < p(E) + p(F ). In
this way, striving to satisfy the normative rule of avoid-
ing sure loss, Alice builds up the theory of probabilities:
Her personal probability for an event E is simply her fair
price for a gamble upon E.
Suppose now that Alice feels compelled to mak-
ing assignments p(E), p(F ), and p(E or F ) such that
p(E or F ) 6= p(E) + p(F ). She detects that something is
amiss. What to do to fix the problem? For this, proba-
bility theory says nothing: It’s now up to Alice to make
an adjustment somewhere, somehow, or else she will be
vulnerable to a sure loss.
Where personalist Bayesianism breaks away the most
from other developments of probability theory is that it
says there are no external criteria for declaring an iso-
lated probability assignment right or wrong. The only
basis for a judgment of adequacy comes from the inside,
from the greater mesh of beliefs Alice may have the time
or energy to access when appraising coherence.
It was not an arbitrary choice of words to title this
section Exactly How Quantum States Fail To Exist, but
a hint of what we must elaborate to develop a per-
fected vaccine against the fever of quantum interpreta-
tions. This is because the phrase has a precursor in a
slogan that Bruno de Finetti, the founder of personalist
Bayesianism, used to vaccinate probability theory itself.
In the preface to his seminal book [32], de Finetti writes,
centered in the page and in all capital letters,
PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST.
It is a powerful statement, constructed to put a finger on
the single most-significant cause of the conceptual prob-
lems in pre-Bayesian probability theory. A probability
is not a solid object, like a rock or a tree that the agent
might bump into, but a feeling, an estimate inside herself.
Previous to Bayesianism, probability was often
thought to be a physical property4—something objective
and having nothing to do with decision-making or agents
at all. But when thought so, it could be thought only
inconsistently so. And hell hath no fury like an inconsis-
tency scorned. The trouble is always the same in all its
varied and complicated forms: If probability is to be a
physical property, it had better be a rather ghostly one—
one that can be told of in campfire stories, but never quite
prodded out of the shadows. Here’s a sample dialogue:
Pre-Bayesian: Ridiculous, probabilities are with-
out doubt objective. They can be seen in the
relative frequencies they cause.
Bayesian: So if p = 0.75 for some event, after 1000
trials we’ll see exactly 750 such events?
Pre-Bayesian: You might, but most likely you
won’t see that exactly. You’re just likely to
see something close to it.
Bayesian: “Likely”? “Close”? How do you define
or quantify these things without making ref-
erence to your degrees of belief for what will
happen?
Pre-Bayesian: Well, in any case, in the infinite
limit the correct frequency will definitely oc-
cur.
4 Witness Richard von Mises, who even went so far as to write,
“Probability calculus is part of theoretical physics in the same
way as classical mechanics or optics, it is an entirely self-
contained theory of certain phenomena . . . ”[33].
7Bayesian: How would I know? Are you saying
that in one billion trials I could not possibly
see an “incorrect” frequency? In one trillion?
Pre-Bayesian: OK, you can in principle see an
incorrect frequency, but it’d be ever less likely!
Bayesian: Tell me once again, what does “likely”
mean?
This is a cartoon of course, but it captures the essence
and the futility of every such debate. It is better to admit
at the outset that probability is a degree of belief, and
deal with the world on its own terms as it coughs up its
objects and events. What do we gain for our theoretical
conceptions by saying that along with each actual event
there is a ghostly spirit (its “objective probability,” its
“propensity,” its “objective chance”) gently nudging it
to happen just as it did? Objects and events are enough
by themselves.
Similarly for quantum mechanics. Here too, if ghostly
spirits are imagined behind the actual events produced
in quantum measurements, one is left with conceptual
troubles to no end. The defining feature of QBism [1–12]
is that it says along the lines of de Finetti, “If this is going
to be done right, we must go this far.” Specifically, there
can be no such thing as a right and true quantum state,
if such is thought of as defined by criteria external to
the agent making the assignment: Quantum states must
instead be like personalist, Bayesian probabilities.
The direct connection between the two foundational
issues is this. Quantum states, through the Born rule,
can be used to calculate probabilities. Conversely, if one
assigns probabilities for the outcomes of a well-selected
set of measurements, then this is mathematically equiva-
lent to making the quantum-state assignment itself. The
two kinds of assignments determine each other uniquely.
Just think of a spin-12 system. If one has elicited one’s
degrees of belief for the outcomes of a σx measurement,
and similarly one’s degrees of belief for the outcomes of
σy and σz measurements, then this is the same as speci-
fying a quantum state itself: For if one knows the quan-
tum state’s projections onto three independent axes, then
that uniquely determines a Bloch vector, and hence a
quantum state. Something similar is true of all quan-
tum systems of all sizes and dimensionality. There is no
mathematical fact embedded in a quantum state ρ that
is not embedded in an appropriately chosen set of prob-
abilities.5 Thus generally, if probabilities are personal in
the Bayesian sense, then so too must be quantum states.
What this buys interpretatively, beside airtight consis-
tency with the best understanding of probability theory,
is that it gives each quantum state a home. Indeed, a
home localized in space and time—namely, the physical
site of the agent who assigns it! By this method, one
5 See Section VII where this statement is made precise in all di-
mensions.
expels once and for all the fear that quantum mechan-
ics leads to “spooky action at a distance,” and expels as
well any hint of a problem with “Wigner’s friend” [34]. It
does this because it removes the very last trace of confu-
sion over whether quantum states might still be objective,
agent-independent, physical properties.
The innovation here is that, for most of the history
of efforts to take an informational point of view about
quantum states, the supporters of the idea have tried to
have it both ways: that on the one hand quantum states
are not real physical properties, yet on the other there
is a right and true quantum state independent of the
agent after all. For instance, one hears things like, “The
right quantum state is the one the agent should adopt
if he had all the information.” The tension in these two
desires leaves their holders open to attack on both flanks
and general confusion all around.
Take first instantaneous action at a distance—the hor-
ror of this idea is often one of the strongest motivations
for those seeking to take an informational stance on quan-
tum states. But, now an opponent can say:
If there is a right quantum state, then why
not be done with all this squabbling and call
the state a physical fact to begin with? It
is surely external to the agent if the agent
can be wrong about it. But, once you admit
that (and you should admit it), you’re sunk:
For, now what recourse do you have to declare
no action at a distance when a delocalized
quantum state changes instantaneously?
Here I am with a physical system right in
front of me, and though my probabilities for
the outcomes of measurements I can do on
it might have been adequate a moment ago,
there is an objectively better way to gamble
now because of something that happened far
in the distance? (Far in the distance and
just now.) How could that not be the sig-
nature of action at a distance? You can try
to defend yourself by saying “quantum me-
chanics is all about relations”6 or some other
6 A typical example is of a woman traveling far from home
when her husband divorces her. Instantaneously she becomes
unmarried—marriage is a relational property, not something lo-
calized at each partner. It seems to be popular to give this
example and say, “Quantum mechanics might be like that.” The
conversation usually stops without elaboration, but let’s carry it
a little further: Suppose the woman, Carol, is right in front of Al-
ice. Alice has a set of probabilities for what might happen should
she buy Carol a celebratory bottle of tequila and congratulate
Carol on losing the deadbeat. Would the far-off divorce mean
that there is instantaneously a different set of probabilities that
Alice could use for weighing the consequences of those actions?
Not at all. Alice would have no account to change her probabili-
ties (not due to the divorce, anyway) until Alice became aware of
Carol’s changed relation, however long it might take that news
to get to Alice.
8feel-good phrase, but I’m talking about mea-
surements right here, in front of me, with out-
comes I can see right now. Ones entering my
awareness—not outcomes in the mind of God
who can see everything and all relations. It
is that which I am gambling upon with the
help of the quantum formalism. An objec-
tively better quantum state would mean that
my gambles and actions, though they would
have been adequate a moment ago, are now
simply wrong in the eyes of the world—they
could have been better. How could the quan-
tum system in front of me generate outcomes
instantiating that declaration without being
privy to what the eyes of the world already
see? That’s action at a distance, I say, or
at least a holism that amounts to the same
thing—there’s nothing else it could be.
Without the protection of truly personal quantum-
state assignments, action at a distance is there as
doggedly as it ever was. And things only get worse with
“Wigner’s friend” if one insists there be a right quantum
state. As it turns out, the method of mending this co-
nundrum displays one of the most crucial ingredients of
QBism. Let us put it in plain sight.
“Wigner’s friend” is the story of two agents, Wigner
and his friend, and one quantum system—the only de-
viation we make from a more common presentation7 is
that we put the story in informational terms. It starts off
with the friend and Wigner having a conversation: Sup-
pose they both agree that some quantum state |ψ〉 cap-
tures their mutual beliefs about the quantum system.8
Furthermore suppose they agree that at a specified time
the friend will make a measurement on the system of
some observable (outcomes i = 1, . . . , d). Finally, they
both note that if the friend gets outcome i, he will (and
should) update his beliefs about the system to some new
quantum state |i〉. There the conversation ends and the
action begins: Wigner walks away and turns his back to
his friend and the supposed measurement. Time passes
to some point beyond when the measurement should have
taken place.
What now is the “correct” quantum state each agent
should have assigned to the quantum system? We have
already concurred that the friend will and should assign
some |i〉. But what of Wigner? If he were to consistently
dip into his mesh of beliefs, he would very likely treat his
friend as a quantum system like any other: one with some
initial quantum state ρ capturing his (Wigner’s) beliefs
of it (the friend), along with a linear evolution operator9
7 For instance, see Ref. [35].
8 Being Bayesians, of course, they don’t have to agree at this
stage—for recall |ψ〉 is not a physical fact for them, only a cata-
logue of beliefs. But suppose they do agree.
9 We suppose for the sake of introducing less technicality that U is
FIG. 2: In contemplating a quantum measurement, one
makes a conceptual split in the world: one part is treated
as an agent, and the other as a kind of reagent or catalyst
(one that brings about change in the agent itself). The latter
is a quantum system of some finite dimension d. A quantum
measurement consists first in the agent taking an action on
the quantum system. The action is represented formally by
a set of operators {Ei}—a positive-operator-valued measure.
The action generally leads to an incompletely predictable con-
sequence Ei for the agent. The quantum state |ψ〉 makes no
appearance but in the agent’s head; for it captures his degrees
of belief concerning the consequences of his actions, and, in
contrast to the quantum system itself, has no existence in the
external world. Measurement devices are depicted as pros-
thetic hands to make it clear that they should be consid-
ered an integral part of the agent. The sparks between the
measurement-device hand and the quantum system represent
the idea that the consequence of each quantum measurement
is a unique creation within the previously existing universe.
Two points are decisive in distinguishing this picture of quan-
tum measurement from a kind of solipsism: 1) The concep-
tual split of agent and external quantum system: If it were
not needed, it would not have been made. 2) Once the agent
chooses an action {Ei} to take, the particular consequence
Ek of it is beyond his control—that is, the actual outcome is
not a product of his whim and fancy.
U to adjust those beliefs with the flow of time.10 Sup-
pose this quantum state includes Wigner’s beliefs about
everything he assesses to be interacting with his friend—
in old parlance, suppose Wigner treats his friend as an
a unitary operation, rather than the more general completely
positive trace-preserving linear maps of quantum information
theory [36]. This, however, is not essential to the argument.
10 For an explanation of the status of unitary operations from the
QBist perspective, as personal judgments directly analogous to
quantum states themselves, see Section VII and Refs. [2, 5, 37].
9isolated system. From this perspective, before any fur-
ther interaction between himself and the friend or the
other system, the quantum state Wigner would assign
for the two together would be U
(
ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U† — most
generally an entangled quantum state. The state of the
system itself for Wigner would be gotten from this larger
state by a partial trace operation; in any case, it will not
be an |i〉.
Does this make Wigner’s new state assignment incor-
rect? After all, “if he had all the information” (i.e., all
the facts of the world) wouldn’t that include knowing the
friend’s measurement outcome? Since the friend should
assign some |i〉, shouldn’t Wigner himself (if he had all
the information)? Or is it the friend who is incorrect?
For if the friend had “all the information,” wouldn’t he
say that he is neglecting that Wigner could put the sys-
tem and himself into the quantum computational equiv-
alent of an iron lung and forcefully reverse the so-called
measurement? I.e., Wigner, if he were sufficiently sophis-
ticated, should be able to force
U
(
ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U† −→ ρ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ| . (5)
And so the back and forth goes. Who has the right state
of information? The conundrums simply get too heavy
if one tries to hold to an agent-independent notion of
correctness for otherwise personalistic quantum states.
A QBist dispels these and similar difficulties by being
conscientiously forthright. Whose information? “Mine!”
Information about what? “The consequences (for me) of
my actions upon the physical system!” It’s all “I-I-me-me
mine,” as the Beatles sang.
The answer to the first question surely comes as no
surprise by now, but why on earth the answer for the
second? Why something so egocentric, anthropocentric,
psychology-laden, and positivistic (we’ve heard any num-
ber of expletives) as the consequences (for me) of my ac-
tions upon the system? Why not simply say something
neutral like “the outcomes of measurements”? Or, why
not fall in line with Wolfgang Pauli and say [38]:
The objectivity of physics is . . . fully ensured
in quantum mechanics in the following sense.
Although in principle, according to the the-
ory, it is in general only the statistics of series
of experiments that is determined by laws,
the observer is unable, even in the unpre-
dictable single case, to influence the result of
his observation—as for example the response
of a counter at a particular instant of time.
Further, personal qualities of the observer do
not come into the theory in any way—the ob-
servation can be made by objective registering
apparatus, the results of which are objectively
available for anyone’s inspection. [Our em-
phasis.]
To the uninitiated, our answer for Information about
what? surely appears to be a cowardly, unnecessary re-
treat from realism. But it is the opposite. The answer
we give is the very injunction that keeps the potentially
conflicting statements of Wigner and his friend in check,
at the same time as giving each agent a hook to the
external world in spite of QBism’s egocentric quantum
states. Pauli’s statement certainly wouldn’t have done
that. Results objectively available for anyone’s inspec-
tion? This is the whole issue with “Wigner’s friend” in
the first place. If both agents could just “look” at the
counter simultaneously with negligible effect in principle,
we would not be having this discussion.
You see, for the QBist, the real world, the one both
agents are embedded in—with its objects and events—
is taken for granted. What is not taken for granted
is each agent’s access to the parts of it he has not
touched. Wigner holds two thoughts in his head: 1)
that his friend interacted with a quantum system, elicit-
ing some consequence of the interaction for himself, and
2) after the specified time, for any of Wigner’s own fur-
ther interactions with his friend or system or both, he
ought to gamble upon their consequences according to
U
(
ρ ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|)U†. One statement refers to the friend’s
potential experiences, and one refers to Wigner’s own.
So long as it is explicit that U
(
ρ⊗|ψ〉〈ψ|)U† refers to the
latter—i.e., how Wigner should gamble upon the things
that might happen to him—making no statement what-
soever about the former, there is no conflict. The world
is filled with all the same things it was before quantum
theory came along, like each of our experiences, that rock
and that tree, and all the other things under the sun; it
is just that quantum theory provides a calculus for gam-
bling on each agent’s own experiences—it doesn’t give
anything else than that. It certainly doesn’t give one
agent the ability to conceptually pierce the other agent’s
personal experience. It is true that with enough effort
Wigner could enact Eq. (5), causing him to predict that
his friend will have amnesia to any future questions on his
old measurement results. But we always knew Wigner
could do that—a mallet to the head would have been
good enough.
The key point is that quantum theory, from this light,
takes nothing away from the usual world of common ex-
perience we already know. It only adds.11 At the very
least it gives each agent an extra tool with which to nav-
igate the world. More than that, the tool is here for a
reason. QBism says that when an agent reaches out and
touches a quantum system—when he performs a quantum
measurement—this process gives rise to birth in a nearly
literal sense. With the action of the agent upon the sys-
tem, the no-go theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker as-
sert that something new comes into the world that wasn’t
there previously: It is the “outcome,” the unpredictable
consequence for the very agent who took the action. John
Archibald Wheeler said it this way, and we follow suit,
“Each elementary quantum phenomenon is an elemen-
11 This point will be much elaborated on in Section IX.
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tary act of ‘fact creation’.” [39]
With this much, QBism has a story to tell on both
quantum states and quantum measurements, but what
of quantum theory as a whole? The answer is found in
taking it as a universal single-user theory in much the
same way that Bayesian probability theory itself is. It is
a user’s manual that any agent can pick up and use to
help make wiser decisions in this world of inherent uncer-
tainty.12 To say it in a more poignant way: In my case, it
is a world in which I am forced to be uncertain about the
consequences of most of my actions; and in your case, it
is a world in which you are forced to be uncertain about
the consequences of most of your actions. “And what of
God’s case? What is it for him?” Trying to give him a
quantum state was what caused this trouble in the first
place! In a quantum mechanics with the understanding
that each instance of its use is strictly single-user—“My
measurement outcomes happen right here, to me, and I
am talking about my uncertainty of them.”—there is no
room for most of the standard, year-after-year quantum
mysteries.
The only substantive conceptual issue left13 before syn-
thesizing a final vaccine is whether quantum mechanics
is obligated to derive the notion of agent for whose aid
the theory was built in the first place. The answer comes
from turning the tables: Thinking of probability theory
in the personalist Bayesian way, as an extension of for-
mal logic, would one ever imagine that the notion of an
agent, the user of the theory, could be derived out of
its conceptual apparatus? Clearly not. How could you
possibly get flesh and bones out of a calculus for making
wise decisions? The logician and the logic he uses are
two different substances—they live in conceptual cate-
gories worlds apart. One is in the stuff of the physical
world, and one is somewhere nearer to Plato’s heaven of
ideal forms. Look as one might in a probability textbook
for the ingredients to reconstruct the reader herself, one
will never find them. So too, the QBist says of quantum
12 Most of the time one sees Bayesian probabilities characterized
(even by very prominent Bayesians like Edwin T. Jaynes [40])
as measures of ignorance or imperfect knowledge. But that de-
scription carries with it a metaphysical commitment that is not
at all necessary for the personalist Bayesian, where probability
theory is an extension of logic. Imperfect knowledge? It sounds
like something that, at least in imagination, could be perfected,
making all probabilities zero or one—one uses probabilities only
because one does not know the true, pre-existing state of affairs.
Language like this, the reader will notice, is never used in this
paper. All that matters for a personalist Bayesian is that there
is uncertainty for whatever reason. There might be uncertainty
because there is ignorance of a true state of affairs, but there
might be uncertainty because the world itself does not yet know
what it will give—i.e., there is an objective indeterminism. As
will be argued in later sections, QBism finds its happiest spot
in an unflinching combination of “subjective probability” with
“objective indeterminism.”
13 Not to worry, there are still plenty of technical ones, as well as
plenty more conceptual ones waiting for after the vaccination.
theory.
What counts as a “user” of quantum theory? Must the
user be conscious? We find that an inopportune way of
phrasing things, for it takes the issue too far afield. In-
stead, we prefer to say it is whatever it takes to be a user
of probability theory. Dogs don’t collapse wave functions
because dogs don’t use wave functions. Upon reading
this argument, one correspondent immediately protested:
“But ants already use probabilities, it has been shown.
For the paths they take, one can model the trajectories
with an appropriate choice of probabilities and utilities.”
To which the QBist involved replied, “No, that’s not
what I mean. And that is no proof whatsoever that ants
use probability theory in the sense I mean it. To use
probability theory, I mean one must use it internally, and
in a normative sense.” Probability assignments spring
from an attempt to organize one’s previous experience
for the purpose of future actions. Ants are surely not
using it normatively. Modeling agents from the outside
(at least in the discussions we’ve seen so far) never takes
into account the normative struggle that is required for
any but the most trivial probability assignments.
With this we finally pin down the precise way in which
quantum theory is “different in character from any physi-
cal theory posed before.” For the QBist, quantum theory
is not something outside probability theory—it is not a
picture of the world as it is, as say Einstein’s program
of a unified field theory hoped to be—but rather it is
an addition to probability theory itself. As probability
theory is a normative theory, not saying what one must
believe, but offering rules of consistency an agent should
strive to satisfy within his overall mesh of beliefs, so it
is the case with quantum theory. If quantum theory is
a user’s manual, one cannot forget that the world is its
author. And from its writing style, one may still be able
to tell something of the author herself. The question is
how to tease out the psychology of the style, frame it,
and identify the underlying motif.
To take this idea into one’s mindset is all the vaccina-
tion one needs against the threat that quantum theory
carries something viral for theoretical physics as a whole.
A healthy body is made healthier still. With this protec-
tion, we are for the first time in a position to ask, with
eyes wide open to what the answer could not be, just
what after all is the world made of? Far from being the
last word on quantum theory, QBism, we believe, is the
start of a great adventure. An adventure full of mystery
and danger, with hopes of triumph . . . and all the marks
of life.
III. TELEPORTATION
“Teleportation” in the quantum information sense isn’t
so very much like the Star Trek version as the press al-
ways wants to portray it. It’s not about getting things
from here to there without going in between, but about
making your information stop being about this and start
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FIG. 3: The Born rule is not like the other classic laws of physics. Its normative nature means, if anything, it is more like
the Biblical Ten Commandments. The classic laws on the left give no choice in their statement: If a field is going to be an
electromagnetic field at all, it must satisfy Maxwell’s equations; it has no choice. Similarly for the other classic laws. Their
statements are intended to be statements concerning nature just exactly as it is. But think of the Ten Commandments. “Thou
shalt not steal.” People steal all the time. The role of the Commandment is to say, “You have the power to steal if you think
you can get away with it, but it’s probably not in your best interest to do so. Something bad is likely to happen as a result.”
Similarly for “Thou shalt not kill,” and all the rest. It is the worshipper’s choice to obey each or not, but if he does not, he
ought to count on something potentially bad in return. “And I commend enjoyment,” urges Ecclesiastes, “for man has nothing
better under the sun than to eat, to drink and to be merry.” This is a guideline for behavior—but one conditioned on, and
justified in terms of, the character of the natural world. The Born rule guides, “Gamble in such a way that all your probabilities
mesh together through me.” The agent is free to ignore the advice, but if he does so, he does so at his own peril. Yet, as with
the advice of Ecclesiastes, the specifics of the rule can tell us about the character of the world we inhabit.
being about that without being about anything else in
between. In slightly stuffier language: Quantum telepor-
tation is the transference of an agent’s predictions about
one object onto another object that has never interacted
with the first.
In the usual way the teleportation drama is staged,
the cast of characters includes an Alice and a Bob who
share two systems in a maximally entangled state, and
implicitly, a Charlie who prepares a third system in the
state of his choice and then hands it off to Alice. Alice
then performs a measurement on the two systems in her
possession and announces the result of the measurement
to Bob. The teleportation process is completed with Bob
performing an operation on his system conditioned upon
his newly acquired information.
In what sense is it completed? Only in this: If Charlie
has the promise that Alice and Bob went through all
the actions described above, then he can safely ascribe
the same quantum state to Bob’s system that he had
originally ascribed to the system he handed off to Alice.
The way in which the story is typically told leads one
to ask, “How is so much information transmitted?” and
“Just how does the information get from Alice to Bob?”
The honest answer is that no information is transmitted
in the process of teleportation (excepting the two bits
that tell Bob which action to perform). The only nontriv-
ial thing transferred in the process of teleportation is ref-
erence. Charlie’s information—that is, his compendium
of Bayesian degrees of belief—stops being about the qubit
he just handed off to Alice and starts being about Bob’s.
Here’s a corresponding classical example. In place of
entanglement, let us equip Alice and Bob each with a coin
(oriented heads or tails) encased in a magical opaque box.
These magical opaque boxes have the following proper-
ties: 1) though one cannot see how a coin is oriented
within it, one can nevertheless reach inside a box and
turn the coin over if one wishes, and 2) if one touches two
of these boxes together, they will glow green if the coins
within them have the same orientations, and they will
glow red if they have opposite orientations—the glow-
ing reveals nothing about the actual orientation of either
coin, only about their relationship. Finally let us stipu-
late the following for Alice and Bob: That their opaque
boxes contain identically oriented coins, but Alice and
Bob (or anyone else for that matter) know nothing more
about the coins beyond that. In other words, Alice and
Bob possess HH or TT, but they do not know which.
Now, as in quantum teleportation let us introduce a
third character, Charlie. Charlie has an opaque box of
his own. But let us give him some partial certainty about
12
the orientation of his coin. Particularly, let us suppose he
ascribes a probability p for his coin to be heads. This is
a real number between 0 and 1, and in principle it might
take an arbitrarily huge number of bits to specify.
Here’s the protocol. Charlie hands off his coin (encased
in a magical opaque box) to Alice. Alice touches her
newly acquired box to her old box. The two glow red
or green, and she communicates the result to Bob. If
the result was green, Bob leaves his coin alone. If the
result was red, he reaches into his opaque box and turns
the coin over. Meanwhile, Alice randomizes the coins
in her possession, i.e., she shuffles them so that Charlie
no longer knows which is which. Thus from Charlie’s
perspective, he now knows nothing about the coin in the
original box he gave Alice, and he would write down a 50–
50 distribution for heads versus tails. Charlie’s original
state for his original coin is, in this way, “destroyed”. At
that point the “teleportation” process is completed.
Again we can ask, “In what sense is it completed?”
Only in this: If Charlie has the promise that Alice and
Bob went through all the actions described above, then
he can safely ascribe the same probability p to the coin
in Bob’s box (i.e., p that it will be heads) that he had
originally ascribed to the coin in his own box. In other
words, Charlie has everything it takes to update his epis-
temic state about the orientation of the coin in Bob’s box
to what he had originally thought of the coin in his own
box.
Is this wildly exciting? The stuff that would make
headlines in papers all around the world and be called
“teleportation”? At the material cost of transferring a
single bit from Alice to Bob, has Charlie instantaneously
transferred an arbitrarily stupendously big number of
bits (in the form of the real number p) between the two
sites? Not at all! The only thing that was materially
transported from one site to the other was a single bit
(that the boxes glowed red or green). The rest was just
“conditionalizing” or “updating”. And there is no shock-
ing headline in that.
IV. THE MEANING OF NO-CLONING
It is often underappreciated that taking a stand on the
interpretation of quantum states carries with it a fairly
distinctive force on one’s research. For, the stand one
takes implicitly directs the analogies (and disanalogies)
one will seek for comparing classical physics to quantum
physics. At least this is the case for an information the-
oretic conception of quantum states.
In 1995, one of the authors (CAF) was quite taken with
a point that both Asher Peres and Michael Berry em-
phasized in their discussions of quantum chaos and more
broadly [41]. In making a comparison between quan-
tum mechanics and classical Hamiltonian mechanics, the
proper correspondence is not between quantum states
and points in phase space, but between quantum states
and Liouville distributions on the phase space. The key
insight is that the points of phase space are meant to rep-
resent states of reality, whereas the Liouville distributions
are rather explicitly meant to represent one’s uncertainty
about the true state of reality. In an information theo-
retic conception of quantum states, a quantum state too
should not be a state of reality, but uncertainty about
something (maybe not uncertainty of the true state of
reality, but nonetheless uncertainty about something).
If the analogy worked once, then it should be tested
further afield! Furthermore, maybe one could even take
the insight the other way around, from quantum to clas-
sical. This prompted the thought that despite all the
hoopla over the no-cloning theorem, there was noth-
ing particularly quantum mechanical about it. Classi-
cal Liouville evolution preserves phase space volume—
this any graduate student versed in Goldstein’s classical-
mechanics book [42] knows—but a less emphasized con-
sequence of it is that Hamiltonian evolution must pre-
serve the overlap between Liouville distributions as well
(as Peres and Berry had been stressing in their quantum
chaos work). But then the same argument that drives the
proof of the no-cloning theorem for quantum states would
also drive it for classical Liouville distributions—for the
no-cloning theorem is a nearly immediate consequence of
the fact that unitary evolutions preserve Hilbert-space
inner products. So, nonorthogonal quantum states can-
not be cloned, but neither can nonorthogonal classical
Liouville distributions [43].
A historical aside: The issue of no-cloning boils down
to an almost immediate consequence of unitarity—inner
products cannot decrease. In fact, Wigner’s theorem
on symmetries [44] even shows that the group of time-
continuous, inner-product preserving maps on Hilbert
space is strictly equivalent to the unitary group. There-
fore, it is an intriguing historical fact that Wigner him-
self just missed the no-cloning theorem! In a 1961 paper,
Wigner took on the question, “How probable is life?” [45].
He did this by identifying the issue of self-reproduction
with the existence of the types of maps required for the
cloning of quantum states. He didn’t tackle the question
of cloning for a completely unknown quantum state head
on, but instead analysed the “fraction” of unitary oper-
ators on a tensor-product Hilbert space that can lead to
a cloning transformation for at least some states. Nev-
ertheless, he states quite clearly that an arbitrary linear
superposition of clonable states ought also to be clonable.
But this, of course, cannot be.
The fact that both teleportation and no-cloning arise
in classical statistical theories has implications for the
project of reconstructing quantum theory. In our search
for deep principles, should we try to rederive quantum
physics from the postulate that “quantum information
can be teleported,” or that “quantum information can-
not be cloned”? These phenomena being not at all funda-
mentally quantum makes them feel like poor candidates
for the seed from which quantum theory grows. It would
be far better to seek that essential DNA in the answer to
the question, Information about what?
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V. THE ESSENCE OF BELL’S THEOREM,
QBISM STYLE
It is easy enough to say that a quantum system (and
hence each piece of the world) is a “seat of possibility.” In
a spotty way, certain philosophers have been saying sim-
ilar things for 150 years. What is unique about quantum
theory in the history of thought is the way in which its
mathematical structure has pushed this upon us to our
very surprise. It wasn’t that all these grand statements
on the philosophical structure of the world were built
into the formalism, but that the formalism reached out
and shook its users until they opened their eyes. Bell’s
theorem and all its descendants are examples of that.
So when the users opened their eyes, what did they see?
From the look of several recent prominent expositions
[46–48], the lesson was indisputably what Tim Maudlin
put so forcefully in [49],
What Bell proved, and what theoretical
physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that
the physical world itself is nonlocal.
The world really is full of spooky action at a distance—
live with it and love it! But conclusions drawn from even
the most rigorous of theorems can only be additions to
one’s prior understanding and beliefs when the theorems
do not contradict those beliefs flat out. Such was the case
with Bell’s theorem. It has just enough room in it to not
contradict a misshapen notion of probability, and that
is the hook and crook that the sci-fi fans have thrived
on. A QBist, however, with a different understanding
of probability and a commitment to the idea that quan-
tum measurement outcomes are personal, draws quite a
different conclusion from the theorem. In fact it is a con-
clusion from the far opposite end of the spectrum: It
tells of a world unknown to most monist and rationalist
philosophies: The universe, far from being one big nonlo-
cal block, should be thought of as a thriving community
of connubial, but otherwise autonomous entities. That
the world should violate Bell’s theorem remains, even for
QBism, the deepest statement ever drawn from quantum
theory. It says that quantum measurements are moments
of creation.
This language has already been integral to our presen-
tation, but seeing it come about in a formalism-driven
way like Bell’s makes the issue particularly vivid. Here
we devote some effort to showing that the language of
creation is a consequence of three things: 1) the quan-
tum formalism, 2) a personalist Bayesian interpretation
of probability, and 3) the elementary notion of what it
means to be two objects rather than one. We do not do
it however with Bell’s theorem precisely, but with an ar-
gument that more directly implicates the EPR “criterion
of reality” as the source of trouble with quantum theory.
The thrust of it is that it is the EPR criterion that should
be jettisoned, not locality.
Our starting point is like our previous setup—an agent
and a system—but this time we make it two systems:
One of them, the left-hand one, is ready. The other,
the right-hand one, is waiting. The agent will eventually
measure each in turn.14 Simple enough to say, but things
get hung at the start with the issue of what is meant by
“two systems?” A passage from a 1948 paper of Einstein
[50] captures the essential issue well:
If one asks what is characteristic of the
realm of physical ideas independently of the
quantum-theory, then above all the follow-
ing attracts our attention: the concepts of
physics refer to a real external world, i.e.,
ideas are posited of things that claim a “real
existence” independent of the perceiving sub-
ject (bodies, fields, etc.), and these ideas are,
on the one hand, brought into as secure a re-
lationship as possible with sense impressions.
Moreover, it is characteristic of these physi-
cal things that they are conceived of as being
arranged in a space-time continuum. Fur-
ther, it appears to be essential for this ar-
rangement of the things introduced in physics
that, at a specific time, these things claim an
existence independent of one another, inso-
far as these things “lie in different parts of
space.” Without such an assumption of the
mutually independent existence (the “being-
thus”) of spatially distant things, an assump-
tion which originates in everyday thought,
physical thought in the sense familiar to us
would not be possible. Nor does one see how
physical laws could be formulated and tested
without such a clean separation. . . .
For the relative independence of spatially dis-
tant things (A and B), this idea is charac-
teristic: an external influence on A has no
immediate effect on B; this is known as the
“principle of local action,” . . . . The complete
suspension of this basic principle would make
impossible the idea of (quasi-) closed systems
and, thereby, the establishment of empirically
testable laws in the sense familiar to us.
We hope it is clear to the reader by now that QBism
concurs with every bit of this. Quantum states may not
be the stuff of the world, but QBists never shudder from
positing quantum systems as “real existences” external
to the agent. And just as the agent has learned from
long, hard experience that he cannot reach out and touch
anything but his immediate surroundings, so he imagines
of every quantum system, one to the other. What is it
that A and B are spatially distant things but that they
are causally independent?
14 It should be noted how we depart from the usual presentation
here: There is only the single agent and his two systems. There
is no Alice and Bob accompanying the two systems.
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This notion, in Einstein’s hands,15 led to one of the
nicest, most direct arguments that quantum states can-
not be states of reality, but must be something more like
states of information, knowledge, expectation, or belief
[52]. The argument is important—let us repeat the whole
thing from Einstein’s most thorough version of it [53]. It
more than anything sets the stage for a QBist develop-
ment of a Bell-style contradiction.
Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp
reality as it is thought independently of its
being observed. In this sense on speaks of
“physical reality.” In pre-quantum physics
there was no doubt as to how this was to
be understood. In Newton’s theory reality
was determined by a material point in space
and time; in Maxwell’s theory, by the field
in space and time. In quantum mechanics
it is not so easily seen. If one asks: does
a ψ-function of the quantum theory repre-
sent a real factual situation in the same sense
in which this is the case of a material sys-
tem of points or of an electromagnetic field,
one hesitates to reply with a simple “yes” or
“no”; why? What the ψ-function (at a defi-
nite) time asserts, is this: What is the prob-
ability for finding a definite physical magni-
tude q (or p) in a definitely given interval,
if I measure it at time t? The probability
is here to be viewed as an empirically deter-
minable, therefore certainly as a “real” quan-
tity which I may determine if I create the
same ψ-function very often and perform a q-
measurement each time. But what about the
single measured value of q? Did the respec-
tive individual system have this q-value even
before this measurement? To this question
there is no definite answer within the frame-
work of the theory, since the measurement is
a process which implies a finite disturbance of
the system from the outside; it would there-
fore be thinkable that the system obtains a
definite numerical value for q (or p) the mea-
sured numerical value, only through the mea-
surement itself. For the further discussion I
shall assume two physicists A and B, who
represent a different conception with refer-
ence to the real situation as described by the
ψ-function.
A. The individual system (before the measure-
ment) has a definite value of q (or p) for all
15 Beware! This is not to say in the hands of EPR—Einstein, Podol-
sky, and Rosen. The present argument is not their argument. For
a discussion of Einstein’s dissatisfaction with the one appearing
in the EPR paper itself, see [51].
variables of the system, and more specifically,
that value which is determined by a measure-
ment of this variable. Proceeding from this
conception, he will state: The ψ-function is
no exhaustive description of the real situation
of the system but an incomplete description;
it expresses only what we know on the basis of
former measurements concerning the system.
B. The individual system (before the measure-
ment) has no definite value of q (or p). The
value of the measurement only arises in co-
operation with the unique probability which
is given to it in view of the ψ-function only
through the act of measurement itself. Pro-
ceeding from this conception, he will (or, at
least, he may) state: The ψ-function is an ex-
haustive description of the real situation of the
system.
We now present to these two physicists the
following instance: There is to be a system
which at the time t of our observation con-
sists of two partial systems S1 and S2, which
at this time are spatially separated and (in
the sense of classical physics) are without sig-
nificant reciprocity. The total system is to
be completely described through a known ψ-
function ψ12 in the sense of quantum me-
chanics. All quantum theoreticians now agree
upon the following: If I make a complete mea-
surement of S1, I get from the results of the
measurement and from ψ12 an entirely def-
inite ψ-function ψ2 of the system S2. The
character of ψ2 then depends upon what kind
of measurement I undertake on S1.
Now it appears to me that one may speak of
the real factual situation of the partial system
S2. Of this real factual situation, we know
to begin with, before the measurement of S1,
even less than we know of a system described
by the ψ-function. But on one supposition we
should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast:
The real factual situation of the system S2
is independent of what is done with the sys-
tem S1, which is spatially separated from the
former. According to the type of measure-
ment which I make of S1, I get, however, a
very different ψ2 for the second partial sys-
tem. Now, however, the real situation of S2
must be independent of what happens to S1.
For the same real situation of S2 it is possible
therefore to find, according to one’s choice,
different types of ψ-function. . . .
If now the physicists, A and B, accept this
consideration as valid, then B will have to
give up his position that the ψ-function con-
stitutes a complete description of a real fac-
tual situation. For in this case it would
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be impossible that two different types of ψ-
functions could be coordinated with the iden-
tical factual situation of S2.
Aside from asserting a frequentistic conception of prob-
ability, the argument is nearly perfect. It tells us one
important reason why we should not be thinking of quan-
tum states as the ψ-ontologists do. Particularly, it is one
we should continue to bear in mind as we move to a Bell-
type setting: Even there, there is no reason to waiver
on its validity. It may be true that Einstein implicitly
equated “incomplete description” with “there must exist
a hidden-variable account” (though we do not think he
did), but the argument as stated neither stands nor falls
on this issue.
There is, however, one thing that Einstein does miss
in his argument, and this is where the structure of Bell’s
thinking steps in. Einstein says, “to this question there is
no definite answer within the framework of the theory”
when speaking of whether quantum measurements are
“generative” or simply “revealing” of their outcomes. If
we accept everything he said above, then with a little
clever combinatorics and geometry one can indeed settle
the question.
Let us suppose that the two spatially separated sys-
tems in front of the agent are two ququarts (i.e., each sys-
tem is associated with a four-dimensional Hilbert space
H4), and that the agent ascribes a maximally entangled
state to the pair, i.e., a state |ψ〉 in H4⊗H4 of the form,
|ψ〉 = 1
2
4∑
i=1
|i〉|i〉 . (6)
Then we know that there exist pairs of measurements,
one for each of the separate systems, such that if the out-
come of one is known (whatever the outcome), one will
thereafter make a probability-one statement concerning
the outcome of the other. For instance, if a nondegener-
ate Hermitian operator H is measured on the left-hand
system, then one will thereafter ascribe a probability-one
assignment for the appropriate outcome of the transposed
operator HT on the right-hand system. What this means
for a Bayesian agent is that after performing the first
measurement he will bet his life on the outcome of the
second.
But how could that be if he has already recognized two
systems with no instantaneous causal influence between
each other? Mustn’t it be that the outcome on the right-
hand side is “already there” simply awaiting confirmation
or registration? It would seem Einstein’s physicist B is
already living in a state of contradiction.
Indeed it must be this kind of thinking that led Ein-
stein’s collaborators Podolsky and Rosen to their famous
sufficient criterion for an “element of [preexistent] real-
ity” [51]:
If, without in any way disturbing a system,
we can predict with certainty (i.e., with prob-
ability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of re-
ality corresponding to that quantity.
Without doubt, no personalist Bayesian would ever ut-
ter such a notion: Just because he believes something
with all his heart and soul and would gamble his life on
it, it would not make it necessarily so by the powers of
nature—even a probability-one assignment is a state of
belief for the personalist Bayesian. But he might still
entertain something not unrelated to the EPR criterion
of reality. Namely, that believing a particular outcome
will be found with certainty on a causally disconnected
system entails that one also believes the outcome to be
“already there” simply awaiting confirmation.
But it is not so, and the QBist has already built
this into her story of measurement. Let us show this
presently16 by combining all the above with a beautifully
simple Kochen–Specker style construction discovered by
Cabello, Estebaranz, and Garc´ıa-Alcaine (CEGA) [57].
Imagine some measurement H on the left-hand system;
we will denote its potential outcomes as a column of let-
ters, like this:
a
b
c
d
(7)
Further, since there is a fixed transformation taking any
H on the left-hand system to a corresponding HT on the
right-hand one, there is no harm in identifying the no-
tation for the outcomes of both measurements. That is
to say, if the agent gets outcome b (to the exclusion of
a, c, and d) for H on the left-hand side, he will make a
probability-one prediction for b on the right-hand side,
even though that measurement strictly speaking is a dif-
ferent one, namely HT. If the agent further subscribes to
(our Bayesian variant of) the EPR criterion of reality, he
will say that he believes b to be TRUE of the right-hand
system as an element of reality.
Now let us consider two possible measurements, H1
and H2 for the left-hand side, with potential outcomes
a
b
c
d
and
e
f
g
h
(8)
respectively. Both measurements cannot be performed
at once, but it might be the case that if the agent gets
a specific outcome for H1, say c particularly, then not
only will he make a probability-one assignment for c in
a measurement of HT1 on the right-hand side, but also
for e in a measurement of HT2 on it. Similarly, if H2
16 Overall this particular technique has its roots in Stairs [54],
and seems to bear some resemblance to the gist of Conway and
Kochen’s “Free Will Theorem” [55, 56].
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were measured on the left, getting an outcome e; then he
will make a probability-one prediction for c in a measure-
ment of HT1 on the right. This would come about if H1
and H2 (and consequently H
T
1 and H
T
2 ) share a common
eigenvector. Supposing so and that c was actually the
outcome for H1 on the left, what conclusion would the
EPR criterion of reality draw? It is that both c and e are
elements of reality on the right, and none of a, b, d, f ,
g, or h are. Particularly, since the right-hand side could
not have known whether H1 or H2 was measured on the
left, whatever c and e stands for, it must be the same
thing, the same property. In such a case, we discard the
extraneous distinction between c and e in our notation
and write
a
b
c
d
and
c
f
g
h
(9)
for the two potential outcome sets for a measurement on
the right.
We now have all the notational apparatus we need to
have some fun. The genius of CEGA was that they were
able to find a set of nine “interlocking” Hermitian oper-
ators H1, H2, . . . , H9 for the left, whose set of potential
outcomes for the corresponding operators on the right
would look like this:
a
b
c
d
a
e
f
g
h
i
c
j
h
k
g
l
b
e
m
n
i
k
n
o
p
q
d
j
p
r
f
l
q
r
m
o
(10)
Take the second column as an example. It means that if
H2 were measured on the left-hand system, only one of a,
e, f , or g would occur—the agent cannot predict which—
but if a occurred, he would be absolutely certain of it also
occurring in a measurement of HT1 on the right. And if
e were to occur on the left, then he would be certain of
getting e as well in a measurement of HT5 on the right.
And similarly with f and g, with their implications for
HT8 and H
T
4 .
The wonderful thing to note about (10) is that every
letter a, b, c, . . . , r occurs exactly twice in the collection.
But the EPR criterion of reality (or our Bayesian variant
of it) would require exactly one letter to have the truth
value TRUE in each column, with the other three having
the value FALSE. In total, nine values of TRUE: A clean
contradiction! For if every letter occurs exactly twice
in the collection, whatever the total number of TRUE
values is, it must be an even number.
To emphasize the point, let us sketch a similar argu-
ment for the case where the two halves are both qutrits,
quantum systems of dimension 3. Again, the argument
is a little variation of the EPR thought experiment. This
time, we begin by ascribing to our bipartite system the
maximally entangled state
|ψ〉 = 1
2
3∑
i=1
|i〉|i〉 . (11)
The experimentalist—let us call her Alice—considers
making a measurement on the left-hand particle in some
basis. If Alice obtains outcome number 2 on the left
side, then she can predict that if she were to make a
particular measurement on the right side, she would get
outcome number 2. (The bases for the left-hand and
right-hand measurements are related by a transpose op-
eration.) So, under the assumption of Einsteinian locality
and the EPR criterion, Alice would say, “Aha! It must be
the case that there is an element of reality on the right
side corresponding to outcome number 2 of that mea-
surement. It’s something inherent in that body.” But we
can play this game with any basis: If Alice were to get
outcome i for a measurement on one particle, she would
predict with certainty that she would get outcome i for
that measurement, transposed, on the other particle.
We’re talking about noncommuting variables here; by
the EPR criterion and locality, Alice would conclude it
must be the case that there were elements of reality as-
sociated with those noncommuting observables. But it is
no fun to consider only one basis, or only two. Instead,
we proceed to analyze a whole set of them, correspond-
ing to one of the qutrit Kochen–Specker constructions,
for instance the one that Asher Peres found [41]. In or-
der to present this construction in a concise way, let us
use an abbreviated notation in which a “2” stands for
√
2
and an overline means a minus sign. Thus, “11¯2” stands
for the ray (1,−1,√2)T. We tabulate the following ten
sets of three orthogonal rays apiece:
001 100 010
101 1¯01 010
011 01¯0 100
11¯2 1¯12 110
102 2¯01 010
211 01¯1 2¯11
201 010 1¯02
112 11¯0 1¯1¯2
012 100 02¯1
121 1¯01 12¯1
(12)
The EPR criterion tells us that for each basis, there
exists an “element of physical reality” that determines
what the outcome of a measurement in that basis will be.
This applies to each row above: According to the EPR
criterion, in any set of three orthogonal rays, one must be
marked TRUE and the other two marked FALSE. But if
we start labeling our rays, marking each one orthogonal
to a TRUE ray with FALSE, eventually we hit a point
where we can’t do it consistently. We end up marking a
set of three orthogonal rays all FALSE, which is against
the rules.
For each of these bases, Alice would have said, “By
making a measurement here, I draw an inference about
the element of reality over there.” She can do it for one,
she can do it for another, and another . . . but she can’t
do it for all of them without running into trouble!
Something must give. The quick reaction of most of
the quantum foundations community has been to ques-
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FIG. 4: Each ray in Asher Peres’s qutrit Kochen–Specker
construction can be written as a ray in R3 and illustrated by
where those rays intersect a cube.
tion the causal independence of the two systems under
consideration. But if one gives up on the autonomy of
one system from the other—after very explicitly assum-
ing it—this surely amounts to saying that there were
never two systems there after all; the very idea of sepa-
rate systems is a broken concept. This first raises a minor
conundrum: Why then would the quantum formalism en-
gender us to formulate our description from beginning to
end in terms of H3 ⊗H3, rather than simply a raw nine-
dimensional spaceH9? Why is that separating symbol ⊗,
apparently marking some kind of conceptual distinction,
always hanging around?
Reaching much deeper however, if one is willing to
throw away one’s belief in systems’ autonomy from each
other, why would one ever believe in one’s own auton-
omy? All stringent reason for it gets lost, and indeed as
Einstein warns, what now is the meaning of science? As
Hans Primas once emphasized [58],
It is a tacit assumption of all engineering sci-
ences that nature can be manipulated and
that the initial conditions required by experi-
ments can be brought about by interventions
of the world external to the object under in-
vestigation. That is, we assume that the ex-
perimenter has a certain freedom of action
which is not accounted for by first principles
of physics. Without this freedom of choice,
experiments would be impossible. Man’s free
will implies the ability to carry out actions,
it constitutes his essence as an actor. We act
under the idea of freedom, but the topic un-
der discussion is neither man’s sense of per-
sonal freedom as a subjective experience, nor
the question whether this idea could be an
illusion or not, nor any questions of moral
philosophy, but that the framework of experi-
mental science requires the freedom of action
as a constitutive though tacit presupposition.
If the left-hand system can manipulate the right-hand
system, even when by assumption it cannot, then who
is to say that the right-hand system cannot manipulate
the agent herself? To put it still differently: If one is
never allowed to assume causal independence between
separated systems because of a contradiction in the term,
then one can never assume it of oneself either, even with
respect to the components of the world that one thinks
one is manipulating. It would be a wackier world than
even the one QBism entertains.
But QBism’s world is not such a bad world, and some
of us find its openness to possibility immensely exciting.
What gives way in this world is not the idea of reality,
but simply the narrow-minded EPR criterion for it. We
jettison both the idea that a probability-one assignment
implies there is a pre-existent outcome (property) “over
there” waiting to be revealed and, barring that, that it
must have been “over here” pre-existent, waiting to be
transferred and then revealed. The solution lies closer to
one of John Wheeler’s quips, “No question? No answer.”
A probability-one assignment lays no necessary claim on
what the world is, but what the agent using it believes
with all her heart and soul. In the case of our present
example, what the agent believes is that if an outcome b
came about as a result of her action H on the left-hand
system, an outcome b would come about if she were to
perform the action HT on the right-hand system. But if
she does not walk over to the right-hand system and take
the action, there is no good sense in which the outcome
(or property) b is already there. Measurement is not a
passive process, but instead a fundamentally participa-
tory one.
At the instigation of a quantum measurement, some-
thing new comes into the world that was not there before;
and that is about as clear an instance of creation as one
can imagine. Sometimes one will have no strong beliefs
for what will result from the creation (as with the mea-
surement of H), and sometimes one will have very strong
beliefs (as with the subsequent measurement of HT ), but
a free creation of nature it remains.
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VI. THE QUANTUM DE FINETTI THEOREM
You know how men have always hankered after unlaw-
ful magic, and you know what a great part in magic
words have always played. If you have his name, . . .
you can control the spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever
the power may be. Solomon knew the names of all the
spirits, and having their names, he held them subject
to his will. So the universe has always appeared to the
natural mind as a kind of enigma, of which the key
must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or
power-bringing word or name. That word names the
universe’s principle, and to possess it is after a fashion
to possess the universe itself.
But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot
look on any such word as closing your quest. You must
bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it
at work within the stream of your experience. It ap-
pears less as a solution, then, than as a program for
more work, and more particularly as an indication of
the ways in which existing realities may be changed.
Theories thus become instruments, not answers to
enigmas, in which we can rest. We don’t lie back upon
them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature
over again by their aid.
— William James
Since the beginning, those who brought Bayesian prob-
ability into quantum physics have been on the run prov-
ing technical theorems whenever required to close a gap
in their logic or negate an awkwardness induced by their
new way of speaking. It was never enough to “lie back
upon” the pronouncements: They had to be shown to
have substance, something that would drive physics it-
self forward. A case in point is the quantum de Finetti
theorem [3, 59].
The term “unknown state” is ubiquitous in quantum
information: Unknown quantum states are teleported,
protected with quantum error correcting codes, used to
check for quantum eavesdropping, and arise in innumer-
able other applications. For a QBist, though, the phrase
can only be an oxymoron: If quantum states are com-
pendia of beliefs, and not states of nature, then the state
is known to someone, at the very least the agent who
holds it. But if so, then what are experimentalists do-
ing when they say they are performing quantum-state
tomography in the laboratory? The very goal of the pro-
cedure is to characterize the unknown quantum state a
piece of laboratory equipment is repetitively preparing.
There is certainly no little agent sitting on the inside of
the device devilishly sending out quantum systems rep-
resentative of his beliefs, and smiling as the experimenter
on the outside slowly homes in on those private thoughts
through his experiments.
The quantum de Finetti theorem is a result that allows
the story of quantum-state tomography to be told purely
in terms of a single agent—namely, the experimentalist
in the laboratory. In a nutshell, the theorem is this.
Suppose the experimentalist walks into the laboratory
with the very minimal belief that, of the systems her
device is spitting out (no matter how many), she could
interchange any two of them and it would not change the
statistics she expects for any measurements she might
perform. Then the theorem says that “coherence with
this belief alone” requires her to make a quantum-state
assignment ρ(n) (for any n of those systems) that can be
represented in the form:
ρ(n) =
∫
P (ρ) ρ⊗n dρ , (13)
where P (ρ) dρ is some probability measure on the space
of single-system density operators and ρ⊗n = ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ
represents an n-fold tensor product of identical quantum
states.
To put it in words, this theorem licenses the exper-
imenter to act as if each individual system has some
state ρ unknown to her, with a probability density P (ρ)
representing her ignorance of which state is the true one.
But it is only as if—the only active quantum state in the
picture is the one the experimenter actually possesses in
her mind, namely ρ(n). When the experimenter performs
tomography, all she is doing is gathering data system-by-
system and updating, via Bayes rule [60], the state ρ(n)
to some new state ρ(k) on a smaller number of remaining
systems. Particularly, one can prove that this form of
quantum-state assignment leads the agent to expect that
with more data, she will make her P (ρ) more and more
narrow, and thus she will approach ever more closely a
posterior state of the form ρ(k) ≈ ρ⊗k. This is the real,
underlying reason that excuses the habit of speaking of
tomography as revealing “the unknown quantum state.”
One important consequence of this theorem is the fol-
lowing. Suppose that Alice is collaborating with Bob.
From her perspective, Bob is a physical system. Al-
ice mathematically models Bob as having expectations
about the sequence of systems they are studying, expec-
tations that matter to Alice because she can ask Bob
questions and get answers. In Alice’s mental model of
Bob, she writes a de Finetti representation PB(ρ), sat-
isfying the same general properties as her own expecta-
tions, which she encodes into the function PA(ρ). Alice
imagines that she and Bob are receiving the same data.
It follows from the quantum de Finetti theorem that if
PA(ρ) and PB(ρ) initially agree to at least a small ex-
tent, then Alice should expect that their expectations
will come into greater and greater agreement.
Furthermore, just as there is a de Finetti theorem to
make sense of “unknown states,” there is a de Finetti
theorem to make sense of “unknown measurements” and
“unknown processes” [61].
Despite the explicitly foundational motivation, the
quantum de Finetti theorem has nonetheless fared like
a stand-alone result for quantum information theory.
Among other things, it turned out to be useful for proving
the security of some quantum key distribution schemes
[62–64], it became an important component in the anal-
ysis of entanglement detection [65, 66], and even served
in an analysis of the quantum state of propagating laser
light [67, 68].
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During the effort to prove the quantum de Finetti the-
orem, Carlton Caves brought attention to a special type
of quantum measurement. Up to that point, those of us
who were bringing Bayesianism to quantum physics were
in the habit of regarding a quantum state ρ as a “cata-
logue of probabilities.” This way of thinking rested on
the old way of modeling measurements, that is, the von
Neumann tradition, where a measurement corresponds
to an orthonormal basis. The Born rule lets us get prob-
abilities out of a density matrix ρ, yet no single von Neu-
mann basis can yield sufficient information to reconstruct
ρ; hence, the “catalogue of probabilities” language. But
quantum information theory brought a new manner of
thinking, in which a measurement can be any collection
of positive operators that sum to the identity—a Posi-
tive Operator-Valued Measure, or POVM. This change of
perspective opened the possibility of an informationally
complete experiment, i.e., a single measurement whose
statistics suffice to reconstitute an entire density matrix
ρ. Once we have constructed an “IC” POVM, we can
then replace any ρ with a probability distribution. One
matrix ρ, one vector ~p.
At first, Caves believed that proving the quantum
de Finetti theorem would require a specific type of IC
POVM. Luckily, this turned out to be wrong: Finding a
construction of an IC POVM in arbitrary finite Hilbert-
space dimension was enough. However, the particular
kind of IC POVM to which Caves called attention soon
took on a life of its own, and it is to that kind which we
now turn.
VII. SEEKING SICS – THE BORN RULE AS
FUNDAMENTAL
If quantum theory is so closely allied with probabil-
ity theory, then why is it not written in a language that
starts with probability, rather than a language that ends
with it? Why does quantum theory invoke the mathe-
matical apparatus of complex amplitudes, Hilbert spaces,
and linear operators? This question quickly brings us to
the research frontier.
For, actually there are ways to pose quantum theory
purely in terms of probabilities—indeed, there are many
ways, each with a somewhat different look and feel [69].
The work of W. K. Wootters is an example, and as he
emphasized long ago [70],
It is obviously possible to devise a formula-
tion of quantum mechanics without probabil-
ity amplitudes. One is never forced to use
any quantities in one’s theory other than the
raw results of measurements. However, there
is no reason to expect such a formulation to
be anything other than extremely ugly. Af-
ter all, probability amplitudes were invented
for a reason. They are not as directly observ-
able as probabilities, but they make the the-
ory simple. I hope to demonstrate here that
one can construct a reasonably pretty formu-
lation using only probabilities. It may not be
quite as simple as the usual formulation, but
it is not much more complicated.
What has happened in the intervening years is that the
mathematical structures of quantum information theory
have grown significantly richer than the ones he had
based his considerations on—so much so that we may
now be able to optimally re-express the theory. What
was once “not much more complicated,” now has the
promise of being downright insightful.
The key ingredient is a hypothetical structure called a
“symmetric informationally complete positive-operator-
valued measure,” or SIC (pronounced “seek”) for short.
This is a set of d2 rank-one projection operators Πi =
|ψi〉〈ψi| on a finite d-dimensional Hilbert space such that∣∣〈ψi|ψj〉∣∣2 = 1
d+ 1
whenever i 6= j . (14)
Because of their extreme symmetry, it turns out that
such sets of operators, when they exist, have three very
fine-tuned properties: 1) the operators must be linearly
independent and span the space of Hermitian operators,
2) there is a sense in which they come as close to an
orthonormal basis for operator space as they can under
the constraint that all the elements in a basis be posi-
tive semi-definite [71], and 3) after rescaling, they form
a resolution of the identity operator, I =
∑
i
1
dΠi.
The symmetry, positive semi-definiteness, and prop-
erties 1 and 2 are significant because they imply that
an arbitrary quantum state ρ—pure or mixed—can be
expressed as a linear combination of the Πi. Further-
more, the expansion is likely to have some significant
features not found in other, more arbitrary expansions.
The most significant of these becomes apparent when one
takes property 3 into account. Because the operators
Hi =
1
dΠi are positive semi-definite and form a resolu-
tion of the identity, they can be interpreted as labeling
the outcomes of a quantum measurement device—not a
standard-textbook, von Neumann measurement device
whose outcomes correspond to the eigenvalues of some
Hermitian operator, but to a measurement device of the
most general variety allowed by quantum theory, the
POVMs [36, 41]. Particularly noteworthy is the smooth
relation between the probabilities P (Hi) = tr
(
ρHi
)
given
by the Born rule for the outcomes of such a measure-
ment17 and the expansion coefficients for ρ in terms of
the Πi:
ρ =
d2∑
i=1
(
(d+ 1)P (Hi)− 1
d
)
Πi . (15)
17 There is a slight ambiguity in notation here, as Hi is dually used
to denote an operator and an outcome of a measurement. For
the sake of simplicity, we hope the reader will forgive this and
similar abuses.
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There are no other operator bases that give rise to such
a simple formula connecting probabilities with density
operators.
Before getting to that, however, we should reveal what
is so consternating about the SICs: It is the question of
when they exist. Despite years of growing effort since
the definition was first introduced [72–74], no one has
been able to show that they exist in completely general
dimension. All that is known firmly is that they exist
in dimensions 2 through 147 inclusive, as well as in some
scattered cases beyond those: 168, 172, 195, 199, 228, 259
and 323. Dimensions 2–21, 24, 28, 30, 31, 35, 37, 39, 43
and 48 are known through direct or computer-assisted an-
alytic proof; the remaining solutions are known through
numerical calculation, satisfying Eq. (14) to high preci-
sion (in some cases, up to 16,000 digits accuracy).18 For
the remainder of the article we will proceed as if they
do always exist for finite d. At least this is the con-
ceit of our story. We note in passing, however, that the
SIC existence problem is not without wider context: If
they do exist, they solve at least four other (more prac-
tical, non-foundational) optimality problems in quantum
information theory [71, 76–79]. In addition, the results
they imply for Lie and Jordan algebras indicate that if
SICs didn’t always exist, linear algebra itself would have
a drastically different character from one dimension to
another [80]. It would be a nasty trick if SICs failed to
exist!
So suppose they do. Thinking of a quantum state as lit-
erally an agent’s probability assignment for the outcomes
of a potential SIC measurement leads to a new way to ex-
press the Born rule for the probabilities associated with
any other quantum measurement. Consider the diagram
in Figure 4. It depicts a SIC measurement “in the sky,”
with outcomes Hi, and any standard von Neumann mea-
surement “on the ground.”19 For the sake of specificity,
let us say the latter has outcomes Dj = |j〉〈j|, the vectors
|j〉 representing some orthonormal basis. We conceive of
two possibilities (or two “paths”) for a given quantum
system to get to the measurement on the ground: “Path
1” is that it proceeds directly to the measurement on
the ground. “Path 2” is that it proceeds first to the
measurement in the sky and only subsequently to the
measurement on the ground—the two measurements are
cascaded.
Suppose now, we are given the agent’s personal prob-
18 Numerical and some analytical solutions up through dimension
67 are detailed in [75]. Others were reported to us by Andrew
Scott and Marcus Appleby. Numerical solutions in dimensions
122 through 142 and in dimensions 144, 145 and 146 are due to
Michael C. Hoang, in collaboration with the authors, using the
Chimera supercomputer.
19 Do not, however, let the designation “SIC sitting in the
sky” make the device seem too exalted to be of any inter-
est. Already, announcements of experimental implementations
have been made for qubits [81], qutrits [82], and still higher-
dimensional systems [83].
FIG. 5: Any quantum measurement can be conceptualized in
two ways. Suppose an arbitrary von Neumann measurement
“on the ground,” with outcomes Dj = 1, . . . , d. Its probabili-
ties P (Dj) can be derived by cascading it with a fixed fiducial
SIC measurement “in the sky” (of outcomes Hi = 1, . . . , d
2).
Let P (Hi) and P (Dj |Hi) represent an agent’s probabilities,
assuming the measurement in the sky is actually performed.
The probability Q(Dj) represents instead the agent’s proba-
bilities under the assumption that the measurement in the sky
is not performed. The Born rule, in this language, says that
P (Dj), P (Hi), and P (Dj |Hi) are related by the Bayesian-
style Eq. (19).
abilities P (Hi) for the outcomes in the sky and his
personal conditional probabilities P (Dj |Hi) for the out-
comes on the ground subsequent to the sky. I.e., we are
given the probabilities the agent would assign on the sup-
position that the quantum system follows Path 2. Then
“coherence alone” (in the Bayesian sense) is enough to
tell what probabilities P (Dj) the agent should assign for
the outcomes of the measurement on the ground—it is
given by the Law of Total Probability applied to these
numbers:
P (Dj) =
∑
i
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi) . (16)
That takes care of Path 2, but what of Path 1? Is this
enough information to recover the probability assignment
Q(Dj) the agent would assign for the outcomes on Path
1 via a normal application of the Born rule? That is,
that
Q(Dj) = tr(ρDj) (17)
for some quantum state ρ? Maybe, but the answer will
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clearly not be P (Dj). One has
Q(Dj) 6= P (Dj) (18)
simply because Path 2 is not a coherent process (in the
quantum sense!) with respect to Path 1—there is a mea-
surement that takes place in Path 2 that does not take
place in Path 1.
What is remarkable about the SIC representation is
that it implies that, even though Q(Dj) is not equal to
P (Dj), it is still a function of it. Particularly,
Q(Dj) = (d+ 1)P (Dj)− 1
= (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)− 1 . (19)
The Born rule is nothing but a kind of Quantum
Law of Total Probability! No complex amplitudes, no
operators—only probabilities in, and probabilities out.
Indeed, it is seemingly just a rescaling of the old law,
Eq. (16). And in a way it is.
Earlier, we stressed the importance of considering
quantum measurements in all their generality: The no-
tion of “measurement” should include all POVMs, not
just the von Neumann ones. So, what happens if the
measurement on the ground is an arbitrary POVM, not
necessarily given by an orthonormal basis? Then,
Q(Dj) =
d2∑
i=1
[
(d+ 1)P (Hi)− 1
d
]
P (Dj |Hi). (20)
This is only slightly more intricate than our previous ex-
pression, Eq. (19), which is itself a special case of this
more general formula. And the general formula is still
quite similar to the classical prescription for combining
conditional probabilities: We simply stretch the P (Hi)
and then shift them to preserve the overall normaliza-
tion.
But beware: One should not interpret Eq. (20) as inval-
idating probability theory itself in any way! For the old
Law of Total Probability has no jurisdiction in the setting
of our diagram, which compares a two distinct, mutually
exclusive hypothetical scenarios. Path 1 is what Alice
intends to do, but she recognizes that she could in prin-
ciple follow Path 2 instead, and Eq. (20) sets the standard
of consistency to which Alice should strive when mesh-
ing her probabilities together.20 Indeed as any Bayesian
20 This is one place where we can point out a mild historical an-
tecedent to QBism. In the historical study [84], it is pointed out
that Born and Heisenberg, already at the 1927 Solvay conference,
refer to the calculation |cn(t)|2 =
∣∣∑
m Smn(t)cm(0)
∣∣2 and say,
“it should be noted that this ‘interference’ does not represent a
contradiction with the rules of the probability calculus, that is,
with the assumption that the |Snk|2 are quite usual probabili-
ties.” Their reasons for saying this may have been different from
our own, but at least they had come this far.
would emphasize, if there is a distinguishing mark in
one’s considerations—say, the fact of two distinct exper-
iments, not one—then one ought to take that into ac-
count in one’s probability assignments (at least initially
so). Thus there is a hidden, or at least suppressed, condi-
tion in our notation: Really we should have been writing
the more cumbersome, but honest, expressions P (Hi|E2),
P (Dj |Hi, E2), P (Dj |E2), and Q(Dj |E1) all along. With
this explicit, it is no surprise that,
Q(Dj |E1) 6=
∑
i
P (Hi|E2)P (Dj |Hi, E2) . (21)
The message is that quantum theory supplies some-
thing—a new form of “Bayesian coherence,” though em-
pirically based (as quantum theory itself is)—that raw
probability theory does not. The Born rule in these lights
is an addition to Bayesian probability, not in the sense of
a supplier of some kind of more-objective probabilities,
but in the sense of giving extra normative rules to guide
the agent’s behavior when she interacts with the physical
world.
It is a normative rule for reasoning about the conse-
quences of one’s proposed actions in terms of the poten-
tial consequences of an alternative action. It is like noth-
ing else physical theory has contemplated before. Seem-
ingly at the heart of quantum mechanics from the QBist
view is a statement about the impact of hypotheticals
on our expectations for the actual. The impact parame-
ter is metered by a single, significant number associated
with each physical system—its Hilbert-space dimension
d. The larger the d associated with a system, the more
Q(Dj) must deviate from P (Dj). Of course this point
must have been implicit in the usual form of the Born
rule, Eq. (17). What is important from the QBist per-
spective, however, is how the new form puts the signifi-
cant parameter front and center, displaying it in a way
that one ought to nearly trip over.
Understanding this as the goal helps pinpoint the role
of SICs in our considerations. The issue is not that quan-
tum mechanics must be rewritten in terms of SICs, but
that it can be.21 Certainly no one is going to drop the
usual operator formalism and all the standard methods
learned in graduate school to do their workaday calcu-
lations in SIC language exclusively. It is only that the
SICs form an ideal coordinate system for a particular
problem (an important one to be sure, but nonetheless
a particular one)—the problem of interpreting quantum
mechanics. The point of all the various representations
of quantum mechanics (like the various quasi-probability
representations of [69], the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger
pictures, and even the path-integral formulation) is that
they give a means for isolating one or another aspect of
the theory that might be called for by a problem at hand.
21 If everything goes right, that is, and the damned things actually
exist in all dimensions!
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Sometimes it is really important to do so, even for deep
conceptual issues and even if all the representations are
logically equivalent.22 In our case, we want to bring into
plain view the idea that quantum mechanics is an addi-
tion to Bayesian probability theory—not a generalization
of it [85], not something orthogonal to it altogether [86],
but an addition. With this goal in mind, the SIC rep-
resentation is a particularly powerful tool. Through it,
one sees the Born rule as a replacement for a usage of the
Law of Total Probability that one would have made in
another context (one mutually exclusive with the first).
Furthermore it is similarly so of unitary time evolu-
tion in a SIC picture. To explain what this means, let
us change considerations slightly and make the measure-
ment on the ground a unitarily rotated version of the SIC
in the sky. In this setting, Dj =
1
dUΠjU
†, which in turn
implies a simplification of Eq. (20) to,
Q(Dj) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)− 1
d
, (22)
for the probabilities on the ground. Note what this is
saying! As the Born rule is a replacement for the Law
of Total Probability, unitary time evolution is a replace-
ment for it as well. For, if we thought in terms of the
Schro¨dinger picture, P (Hi) and Q(Dj) would be the SIC
representations for the initial and final quantum states
under an evolution given by U†. The similarity is no
accident. This is because in both cases the conditional
probabilities P (Dj |Hi) completely encode the identity of
a measurement on the ground.
Moreover, it makes abundantly clear another point
of QBism that has not been addressed so much in the
present paper. Since a personalist Bayesian cannot turn
his back on the clarification that all probabilities are
personal judgments, placeholders in a calculus of con-
sistency, he certainly cannot turn his back on the greater
lesson Eqs. (20) and (22) are trying to scream out.
Just as quantum states ρ are personal judgments P (Hi),
quantum measurement operators Dj and unitary time
evolutions U are personal judgments too—in this case
P (Dj |Hi). The only distinction is the technical one,
that one expression is an unconditioned probability, while
the other is a collection of conditionals. Most impor-
tantly, it settles the age-old issue of why there should
be two kinds of state evolution at all. When Hartle
wrote, “A quantum-mechanical state being a summary of
22 Just think of the story of Eddington–Finkelstein coordinates in
general relativity. Once upon a time it was not known whether a
Schwarzschild black hole might have, beside its central singular-
ity, a singularity in the gravitational field at the event horizon.
Apparently it was a heated debate, yes or no. The issue was put
to rest, however, with the development of the coordinate system.
It allowed one to write down a solution to the Einstein equations
in a neighborhood of the horizon and check that everything was
indeed all right.
the observers’ information about an individual physical
system changes both by dynamical laws, and whenever
the observer acquires new information about the system
through the process of measurement,” what is his dynam-
ical law making reference to? There are not two things
that a quantum state can do, only one: Strive to be con-
sistent with all the agent’s other probabilistic judgments
on the consequences of his actions, across all hypotheti-
cal scenarios. The SICs emphasize and make this point
clear.
In fact, much of the most intense research of the UMass
Boston QBism group is currently devoted to seeing how
much of the essence of quantum theory is captured by
Eq. (20). We are frankly quite happy to have an ex-
tremely hard problem about the structure of quantum
states spaces leading our thinking! (And, as we’ll see in
the next section, it is a problem that prompts a traveler
to question the received wisdom about the boundary be-
tween physics and pure mathematics.) For instance, one
way to approach this is to take Eq. (20) as a fundamen-
tal axiom and ask what further assumptions are required
to recover all of quantum theory. To give some hint of
how a reconstruction of quantum theory might proceed
along these lines, note Eq. (15) again. What it expresses
is that any quantum state ρ can be reconstructed from
the probabilities P (Hi) the state ρ gives rise to. This,
however, does not imply that plugging just any proba-
bility distribution P (Hi) into the equation will give rise
to a valid quantum state. A general probability distri-
bution P (Hi) in the formula will lead to a Hermitian
operator of trace one, but it may not lead to an opera-
tor with nonnegative eigenvalues. Indeed it takes further
restrictions on the P (Hi) to make this true. That being
the case, the QBist starts to wonder if these restrictions
might arise from the requirement that Eq. (20) simply
always make sense. For note, if P (Dj) is too small in
the special case of Eq. (19), Q(Dj) will go negative; and
if P (Dj) is too large, Q(Dj) will become larger than 1.
So, P (Dj) must be restricted. But that in turn forces
the set of valid P (Hi) to be restricted as well. And so
the argument goes. We already know how to reconstruct
many features of quantum theory in this fashion [5, 87–
89]. The question now is how to get the whole theory
in the most economical way [90]. Should we succeed, we
will have a new development of quantum theory, one that
puts its beguiling deviation from classicality, as encoded
in Eq. (20), front and center.
Another exciting development comes from loosening
the form of Eq. (20) to something more generic:
Q(Dj) =
n∑
i=1
[
αP (Hi)− β
]
P (Dj |Hi); , (23)
where there is initially no assumed relation between α, β,
and n as there is in Eq. (20). Then, under a few further
conditions with only the faintest hint of quantum theory
in them—for instance, that there should exist measure-
ments on the ground for which, under appropriate con-
ditions, one can have certainty for their outcomes—one
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immediately gets a significantly more restricted form for
what becomes the analogue of Eq. (19):
Q(Dj) =
(
1
2
qd+ 1
) n∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)− 1
2
q . (24)
Here, very interestingly, the parameters q and d can
only take on integer values, q = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ and d =
2, 3, 4, . . . ,∞, and n = 12qd(d− 1) + d.
The q = 2 case can be identified with the quantum me-
chanical one we have seen before. On the other hand, the
q = 0 case can be identified with the usual vision of the
classical world: A world where hypotheticals simply do
not matter, for the world just “is.” In this case, an agent
is well advised to take Q(Dj) = P (Dj), meaning that
there is no operational distinction between experiments
E1 and E2 for her. It should not be forgotten however,
that this rule, trivial though it looks, is still an addition
to raw probability theory. It is just one that meshes well
with what had come to be expected by most classical
physicists. To put it yet another way, in the q = 0 case,
the agent says to herself that the fine details of her actions
do not matter. This to some extent authorizes the view
that observation is a passive process in principle—again
the classical worldview. Finally, the cases q = 1 and
q = 4, though not classical, track still other structures
that have been explored previously: They correspond to
what the Born rule would look like if alternate versions
of quantum mechanics, those over real [91] and quater-
nionic [92] vector spaces, were expressed in the equivalent
of SIC terms.23
Several years ago, Ru¨diger Schack gave a talk on this
material in Zurich, and Rob Spekkens asked, “Why that
particular choice for modification of the Law of Total
Probability?” Schack replied, “If one is going to modify
it in any way at all, this is the simplest modification one
can imagine.” The remarkable fact is that the simplest
possible modification to the Law of Total Probability car-
ries with it so much interlocking structure.
If all that you desire is a story that you can tell about
the current quantum formalism, then all this business
about SICs and probabilistic representations might be of
little moment. Of our fellow QBists, we know of one who
likely doesn’t care one way or the other about whether
23 The equivalent of SICs (i.e., informationally complete sets of
equiangular projection operators) certainly do not exist in gen-
eral dimensions for the real-vector-space case—instead these
structures only exist in a sparse set of dimensions, d =
2, 3, 7, 23, . . . . With respect to the quaternionic theory, it ap-
pears from numerical work that they do not generally exist in
that setting either [93]. Complex quantum mechanics, like baby
bear’s possessions, appears to be just right. This raises the pos-
sibility that if one had reason to think that the user’s man-
ual should be one of those three alternatives—real, complex and
quaternionic—demanding the existence of SIC-type structures
in all dimensions could narrow down the choice exactly to the
complex case.
SICs exist. Another would like to see a general proof
come to pass, but is willing to believe that QBism can
just as well be developed without them—i.e., they are not
part of the essential philosophical ideas—and is always
quick to make this point. On the other hand, we two
are inclined to believe that QBism will become stagnant
in the way of all other quantum foundations programs
without a deliberate effort to rebuild the formalism. SICs
might not be the only path to this goal [94], but they
engage our attention for the following reason.
Formula (24) from the general setting indicates more
strongly than ever that it is the role of dimension that is
key to distilling the motif of our user’s manual. Quantum
theory, seen as a normative addition to probability the-
ory, is just one theory (the second rung above classical)
along an infinite hierarchy. What distinguishes the levels
of this hierarchy is the strength q with which dimension
“couples” the two paths in our diagram of Figure 2. It
is the strength with which we are compelled to deviate
from the Law of Total Probability when we transform our
thoughts from the consequences of hypothetical actions
upon a d’s worth of the world’s stuff to the consequences
of our actual ones. Settling upon q = 2 (i.e., settling upon
quantum theory itself) sets the strength of the coupling,
but the d variable remains. Different systems, different d,
different deviations from a naive application of the Law
of Total Probability.
In some way yet to be fully fleshed out, each quantum
system seems to be a seat of active creativity and pos-
sibility, whose outward effect is as an “agent of change”
for the parts of the world that come into contact with
it. Observer and system, “agent and reagent,” might be
a way to put it. Perhaps no metaphor is more pregnant
for QBism’s next move than this: If a quantum system is
comparable to a chemical reagent, then d is comparable
to a valence. But valence for what more exactly?
VIII. MATHEMATICAL INTERMEZZO: THE
SPORADIC SICS
Before we leap off into cosmological speculations, let
us take a moment to make a few things more concrete.
What does a SIC look like, anyway? How do we write
one out explicitly? One of the ongoing challenges of SIC
research is that the solutions look so complicated: As we
go up in the dimension, the vectors soon take many pages
of computer printout. Moreover, there are not obvious
relations between a SIC vector in one dimension and one
in another, so finding one solution doesn’t help with find-
ing the next. It is only recently that we have been able to
tease out some interconnections happening beneath the
surface. In this section, we’ll explore the patterns that
bind sets of SIC solutions together [95, 96].
A SIC is group covariant if it can be constructed by
starting with a single vector (the fiducial) and acting
upon that vector with the elements of some group. All
known SICs are group covariant, although since group
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covariance simplifies the search process, this could be
a matter of the light being under the lamppost. Fur-
thermore, in all known cases but one, that group is a
Weyl–Heisenberg group. Working in dimension d, let
ωd = e
2pii/d, and define the shift and phase operators
X|j〉 = |j + 1〉 and Z|j〉 = ωjd|j〉 , (25)
where the shift is modulo d. Products of powers of X
and Z, together with dimension-dependent phase factors
that we can neglect for the present purposes, define the
Weyl–Heisenberg group for dimension d.
A historical aside: This group dates back to the earliest
days of quantum physics. Note that the two operators
X and Z just fail to commute, doing so up to a phase
factor:
ZX = ωXZ. (26)
In July of 1925, Max Born had the idea that he could
solve one of the equations in Heisenberg’s seminal 1925
paper if he made an ansatz that the position observable
qˆ and momentum observable pˆ satisfied the commutation
relation [97, 98]
qˆpˆ− pˆqˆ = i~Iˆ . (27)
Pascual Jordan later proved that Born’s ansatz was the
only one that could work, and the paper they wrote up
together was received by Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik on 27
September 1925. It was titled “On Quantum Mechan-
ics.” On the same day, Max Born received a letter from
Hermann Weyl [99] saying that a previous discussion they
had earlier in the month inspired him to generalize Born’s
relation (27) to Eq. (26). Part of what pleased Weyl was
that his generalization was not dependent upon infinite
dimensional spaces—Weyl’s relation would always have
a solution in the complex matrices, finite and infinite
dimensional. And by that circumstance he declared to
have a way of “defining a general quantum system”—to
each would be associated a “phase space.” In the discrete
case, the points of the phase space would be associated
with the operators
(m,n) −→ XmZn . (28)
See Weyl’s 1927 textbook [100], as well as Julian
Schwinger’s later development and extension of the idea
in [101]. If a SIC covariant under the Weyl–Heisenberg
group always exists, then it would mean that not only
could a phase space be associated with a quantum sys-
tem abstractly, but that the points of the phase space
very directly correspond to the outcomes of a potential
measurement. It is interesting to see how some of the
earliest math in one of the earliest formulations of the
theory—Weyl’s—came so close to what we are working
with today!
In d = 2, we can draw a SIC in the Bloch representa-
tion. Any qubit SIC forms a tetrahedron inscribed in the
Bloch sphere [74]. One such tetrahedron is, in terms of
the Pauli matrices,
Πs,r =
1
2
(
I +
1√
3
(sσx + rσy + srσz)
)
, (29)
where the sign variables s and r take the values ±1. The
outcome probabilities for a state |ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 are
given by the Born rule, p(s, r) = tr (Πs,r|ψ〉〈ψ|)/2. Ex-
plicitly,
p(s, r) =
1
4
+
√
3
12
sr
(
|α|2 − |β|2
)
+
√
3
6
Re [αβ∗(s+ ir)] .
(30)
This expression simplifies in terms of the Cartesian coor-
dinates (x, y, z) of points on the Bloch sphere:
p(s, r) =
1
4
+
√
3
12
(sx+ ry + srz) . (31)
Two SICs in higher dimensions will be important for
our purposes. First is the Hesse SIC in d = 3, con-
structed by applying the Weyl–Heisenberg group to the
fiducial ∣∣∣ψ(Hesse)0 〉 = 1√
2
(0, 1,−1)T. (32)
Second is the Hoggar SIC in d = 8. We have multiple
choices of fiducial in this case, but they all yield struc-
tures that are equivalent up to unitary or antiunitary
transformations, so for brevity we speak of “the” Hoggar
SIC [102]. One such fiducial [103, 104] is∣∣∣ψ(Hoggar)0 〉 ∝ (−1 + 2i, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)T. (33)
The Hoggar SIC is the only known case where the group
that constructs the SIC from the fiducial is not the Weyl–
Heisenberg group for d dimensions itself [102]. It is, how-
ever, of a related kind: It is the tensor product of three
copies of the qubit Weyl–Heisenberg group. The more
we poke at the Hoggar SIC, the more odd and unusual
things turn up about it [104]. We’ll take a look at one of
them in this section.
The SICs in dimensions 2 and 3, as well as the Hoggar
SIC in dimension 8, stand apart in some respects from
the other known solutions [95, 105]. Recently, Appleby et
al. [95] found a link between SICs and algebraic number
theory. Their results apply to Weyl–Heisenberg SICs in
dimensions 4 and larger. The SICs in dimensions 2 and
3, as well as the Hoggar SIC, fall outside of this category.
Either their dimensions are too small, or (in the case of
the Hoggar SIC) they have the wrong symmetry group.
We can think of them as the sporadic SICs.
First, let us sketch the picture for the SICs studied by
Appleby et al. The pattern, which is just beginning to
come clear, is a story about number fields. To a physicist,
a “field” means something like the electric field, but to a
number theorist, a field is a set of numbers where addition
and multiplication can both be done, and where both
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FIG. 6: The lowest levels of a dimension tower. Conjecturally, Weyl–Heisenberg SICs in these dimensions are related by way
of algebraic number theory [95]. The arithmetical meaning of the arrows is left as an exercise to the interested reader.
additive and multiplicative inverses exist, and everything
plays together nicely. The real numbers R constitute a
field, as do the rational numbers Q within them. We
can build up a field by starting with some base, like the
rationals, and augmenting it with a new element. For
example, let us invent a number “
√
3,” about which all
we know is that it is a positive number that solves the
equation x2 − 3 = 0. We then consider all the numbers
of the form a + b
√
3, where a and b are rational. This
set is a new field, Q extended by the new ingredient
√
3,
which we write as Q(
√
3).
The connection between SICs and number fields hap-
pens when we take the inner-product conditiont that de-
fines a SIC,
|〈ψj |ψk〉|2 = 1
d+ 1
, (34)
and we leave off the magnitude-squared step:
〈ψj |ψk〉 = e
iθjk
√
d+ 1
. (35)
The phase factors eiθjk turn out to live within very spe-
cial number fields, and they are particularly special num-
bers within those fields. They are units of ray class fields
or extensions thereof—as Bengtsson quips, “These words
carry deep meaning for algebraic number theorists” [106].
They mean that we are knocking on the door of Hilbert’s
twelfth problem, one of the last remaining unsolved puz-
zles on history’s most influential list of mathematical
challenges [107]. And, remember, we got here because
we were trying to find a better way to talk about proba-
bility in quantum mechanics!
Part of this still-emerging story [95] is that SICs in
different dimensions are related in a hidden way because
their number fields are related. The SIC phase factors
live in fields that are extensions twice over of the ratio-
nals. That is, for a Weyl–Heisenberg SIC in dimension d,
the phase factors eiθjk make their home in an extension
of Q
(√
(d− 3)(d+ 1)
)
. Because we can factor perfect
squares out from under the radical sign, different values
of d can yield the same extension of Q. This has led
to the image of a dimension tower, an infinite sequence
{d1, d2, d3, . . .} where each dj follows neatly from those
before, and the number theory tells us how to build a SIC
in each dj . But this remains in the realm of conjecture.
And what of the sporadic SICs? Quite unexpectedly,
the qubit SICs, the Hesse SIC and the Hoggar SIC also
connect to a subject in pure mathematics that has gone
mostly un-utilized in physics. Specifically, their symme-
tries are linked with a lattice of integers in the set of
numbers known as the octonions [96]. Physics students
grow familiar with the complex numbers C by repeated
exposure, internalizing the image of a number plane that
extends out on either side of the number line. The quater-
nions (usually written with an H for William Hamilton)
and the octonions (denoted O) arise when one tries to
repeat this dimension-doubling stunt, from two dimen-
sions to four and then to eight. It so happens that famil-
iar properties of arithmetic are lost with each repetition:
Multiplication of quaternions is not commutative, but it
is still associative. And multiplication of octonions is not
even associative! Nineteenth-century physics made much
use of quaternions to study 3D rotations, and they still
find application in geometry, for example in computer
graphics. Octonions are less familiar still, and are per-
haps best known for their relations to exceptional struc-
tures in mathematics. John Baez observed [108],
Often you can classify some sort of gizmo,
and you get a beautiful systematic list, but
also some number of exceptions. Nine times
out of 10 those exceptions are related to the
octonions.
It so transpires that this applies to SICs, too. Moreover,
the link with octonionic integers connects the sporadic
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SICs to the problem of sphere packing, that is, the ques-
tion of how to fit Euclidean spheres of arbitrary dimen-
sion together in the most efficient way [109].
A few years ago, one of the authors (BCS) was attend-
ing an interdisciplinary workshop and, over lunch, fell
into conversation with a mathematician who had that
morning lectured on higher-dimensional sphere packing.
After a little while, the mathematician asked, “And what
are you working on?”
“Too many different things—but one problem has the
same feel as sphere packing, because solutions in one di-
mension don’t seem to tell you about solutions in others.
I guess the math people know it as the problem of ‘com-
plex equiangular lines’.”
“Ah! SICs! You know, when I first heard about that
conjecture, I thought I could just sit down and solve it.
But that didn’t quite happen.”
As the mathematical properties of SIC dimensionalities
grow more intriguing, we are led back to the question of
what the dimension of a Hilbert space means physically.
IX. HILBERT-SPACE DIMENSION AS A
UNIVERSAL CAPACITY
It is entirely possible to conceive of a world com-
posed of individual atoms, each as different from
one another as one organism is from the next.
— John Dupre´
A common accusation heard by the QBist24 is that the
view leads straight away to solipsism, “the belief that all
reality is just one’s imagining of reality, and that one’s
self is the only thing that exists.”25 The accusation goes
that, if a quantum state |ψ〉 only represents the degrees
of belief held by some agent—say, the one portrayed in
Figure 1—then the agent’s beliefs must be the source of
the universe. The universe could not exist without him:
This being such a ridiculous idea, QBism is dismissed out
of hand, reductio ad absurdum. It is so hard for the QBist
to understand how anyone could think this (it being the
antithesis of everything in his worldview) that a little of
our own Latin comes to mind: non sequitur. See Fig. 7.
A fairer-minded assessment is that the accusation
springs from our opponents “hearing” much of what we
do say, but interpreting it in terms drawn from a partic-
ular conception of what physical theories always ought to
24 For perhaps the loudest, see Ref. [110].
25 This is the definition of The American Heritage New Dictionary
of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition (2005). Encyclopedia Brit-
tanica (2008) expands, “in philosophy . . . the extreme form of
subjective idealism that denies that the human mind has any
valid ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself.
The British idealist F. H. Bradley, in Appearance and Reality
(1897), characterized the solipsistic view as follows: ‘I cannot
transcend experience, and experience is my experience. From
this it follows that nothing beyond myself exists; for what is
experience is its (the self’s) states.’ ”
FIG. 7: Sarcasm. In a lecture bottlenecked by repeated ac-
cusations of QBism’s solipsism, the authors sometimes use
the following technique to move things along. Referring to
the previous Figure 1, one asks the stubborn accuser, “What
about this diagram do you not get? It shows an agent and
a physical system external to him. It says that a quantum
state is a state of belief about what will come about as a
consequence of his actions upon the system. The quantum
state is not a state of nature, but so what? There is an agent
with his belief; there is a system that is not part of him; and
there is something that really, eventually comes about—it is
called the outcome. No agent, no outcome for sure, but that’s
not solipsism: For, no system, no outcome either! A quan-
tum measurement without an external system participating
would be like the sound of one hand clapping, a Zen koan. If
we were really expressing solipsism, wouldn’t a diagram like
the one above be more appropriate? A big eyeball surveying
nothing. Now there’s really no external system and nothing
to act upon. That’s solipsism.”
be: Attempts to directly represent (map, picture, copy,
correspond to, correlate with) the universe—with “uni-
verse” here thought of in its totality as a pre-existing,
static system; an unchanging, monistic something that
just is. From such a “representationalist” point of view,
if a) quantum theory is a proper physical theory, b) its
essential theoretical objects are quantum states, and c)
quantum states are states of belief, then the universe that
“just is” corresponds to a state of belief. This chain of
deduction is logical and clear, but completely misguided.
QBism sidesteps the poisoned dart, as the previous
sections have tried to convey, by asserting that quantum
theory is just not a physical theory in the sense the ac-
cusers want it to be. Rather it is an addition to personal,
Bayesian, normative probability theory. Its normative
rules for connecting probabilities (personal judgments)
were developed in light of the character of the world, but
there is no sense in which the quantum state itself repre-
sents (pictures, copies, corresponds to, correlates with) a
part or a whole of the external world, much less a world
that just is. In fact the very character of the theory
seems to point to the inadequacy of the representational-
ist program when attempted on the particular world we
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live in.
There are no lofty philosophical arguments here that
representationalism must be wrong always and in all pos-
sible worlds (perhaps because of some internal inconsis-
tency26). Representationalism may well be true in this or
that setting—we take no stand on the matter. We only
know that for nearly 90 years quantum theory has been
actively resistant to representationalist efforts on its be-
half. This suggests that it might be worth exploring some
philosophies upon which physics rarely sets foot. Physics
of course should never be constrained by any one philos-
ophy (history shows it nearly always lethal), but it does
not hurt to get ideas and insights from every source one
can. If one were to sweep the philosophical literature for
schools of thought representative of what QBism actu-
ally is about, it is not solipsism one will find, but nonre-
ductionism [112, 113], (radical) metaphysical pluralism
[114, 115], empiricism [116, 117], indeterminism and me-
liorism27 [118], and above all pragmatism [29, 119].
A form of nonreductionism can already be seen in play
in our answer to whether the notion of agent should be
derivable from the quantum formalism itself. We say that
it cannot be and it should not be, and to believe other-
wise is to misunderstand the subject matter of quantum
theory. But nonreductionism also goes hand in hand
with the idea that there is real particularity and “in-
teriority” in the world. Think again of the “I-I-me-me
mine” feature that shields QBism from inconsistency in
the “Wigner’s friend” scenario. When Wigner turns his
back to his friend’s interaction with the system, that
piece of reality is hermetically sealed from him. That
phenomenon has an inside, a vitality that he takes no
part in until he again interacts with one or both relevant
pieces of it. With respect to Wigner, it is a bit like a
universe unto itself.
If one seeks the essence of indeterminism in quantum
mechanics, there may be no example more directly illus-
trative of it than “Wigner’s friend.” For it expresses to
a tee William James’s notion of indeterminism [118]:
26 As, e.g., Rorty [111] might try to argue.
27 Strictly speaking, meliorism is the doctrine “that humans can,
through their interference with processes that would otherwise
be natural, produce an outcome which is an improvement over
the aforementioned natural one.” But we would be reluctant
to take a stand on what “improvement” really means. So said,
all we mean in the present essay by meliorism is that the world
before the agent is malleable to some extent—that his actions
really can change it. Adam said to God, “I want the ability to
write messages onto the world.” God replied, “You ask much of
me. If you want to write upon the world, it cannot be so rigid
a thing as I had originally intended. The world would have to
have some malleability, with enough looseness for you to write
upon its properties. It will make your world more unpredictable
than it would have been—I may not be able to warn you about
impending dangers like droughts and hurricanes as effectively as
I could have—but I can make it such if you want.” And with
that Adam brought all host of uncertainties to his life, but he
gained a world where his deeds and actions mattered.
[Chance] is a purely negative and relative
term, giving us no information about that of
which it is predicated, except that it happens
to be disconnected with something else—not
controlled, secured, or necessitated by other
things in advance of its own actual presence.
. . . What I say is that it tells us nothing
about what a thing may be in itself to call
it “chance.” . . . All you mean by calling it
“chance” is that this is not guaranteed, that
it may also fall out otherwise. For the system
of other things has no positive hold on the
chance-thing. Its origin is in a certain fash-
ion negative: it escapes, and says, Hands off!
coming, when it comes, as a free gift, or not
at all.
This negativeness, however, and this opacity
of the chance-thing when thus considered ab
extra, or from the point of view of previous
things or distant things, do not preclude its
having any amount of positiveness and lumi-
nosity from within, and at its own place and
moment. All that its chance-character asserts
about it is that there is something in it really
of its own, something that is not the uncon-
ditional property of the whole. If the whole
wants this property, the whole must wait till
it can get it, if it be a matter of chance. That
the universe may actually be a sort of joint-
stock society of this sort, in which the shar-
ers have both limited liabilities and limited
powers, is of course a simple and conceivable
notion.
And once again [120],
Why may not the world be a sort of republi-
can banquet of this sort, where all the qual-
ities of being respect one another’s personal
sacredness, yet sit at the common table of
space and time?
To me this view seems deeply probable.
Things cohere, but the act of cohesion itself
implies but few conditions, and leaves the rest
of their qualifications indeterminate. As the
first three notes of a tune comport many end-
ings, all melodious, but the tune is not named
till a particular ending has actually come,—so
the parts actually known of the universe may
comport many ideally possible complements.
But as the facts are not the complements, so
the knowledge of the one is not the knowledge
of the other in anything but the few necessary
elements of which all must partake in order to
be together at all. Why, if one act of knowl-
edge could from one point take in the total
perspective, with all mere possibilities abol-
ished, should there ever have been anything
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more than that act? Why duplicate it by the
tedious unrolling, inch by inch, of the fore-
done reality? No answer seems possible. On
the other hand, if we stipulate only a partial
community of partially independent powers,
we see perfectly why no one part controls the
whole view, but each detail must come and be
actually given, before, in any special sense, it
can be said to be determined at all. This is
the moral view, the view that gives to other
powers the same freedom it would have itself.
The train of logic back to QBism is this. If James and
our analysis of “Wigner’s friend” are right, the universe
is not one in a very rigid sense, but rather more truly a
pluriverse.28 To get some sense of what this can mean, it
is useful to start by thinking about what it is not. A good
example can be found by taking a solution to the vacuum
Maxwell equations in some extended region of spacetime.
Focus on a compact subregion and try to conceptually
delete the solution within it, reconstructing it with some
new set of values. It can’t be done. The fields outside
the region (including the boundary) uniquely determine
the fields inside it. The interior of the region has no iden-
tity but that dictated by the rest of the world—it has no
“interiority” of its own. The pluriverse conception says
we’ll have none of that. And so, for any agent immersed
in this world there will always be uncertainty for what
will happen upon his encounters with it. To wit, where
there is uncertainty there should be Bayesian probabili-
ties, and so on and so on until much of the story we have
already told.
What all this hints is that for QBism the proper way to
think of our world is as the empiricist or the radical meta-
physical pluralist does. Let us launch into making this
clearer, for that process more than anything will explain
how QBism hopes to interpret Hilbert-space dimension.
The metaphysics of empiricism can be put like this.
Everything experienced, everything experienceable, has
no less an ontological status than anything else. A child
awakens in the middle of the night frightened that there
is a monster under her bed, one soon to reach up and
steal her arm—that we-would-call-imaginary experience
has no less a hold on onticity than a Higgs-boson de-
tection event at the LHC, or the minuscule wobbles at
LIGO that shook the scientific world. They are of equal
status from this point of view—they are equal elements
in the filling out and making of reality. There is indeed
no doubt that we should call the child’s experience imag-
28 The term “pluriverse” is again a Jamesian one. He used it inter-
changeably with the word “multiverse,” which he also invented
[121]. Unfortunately the latter has been coopted by the Ev-
erettian movement for their own—in the end monistic—purposes:
“The world is one; it is the deterministically evolving univer-
sal quantum state, the ‘multiverse’.” Too bad. Multiverse is a
tempting word, but we stick with pluriverse to avoid any confu-
sion with the Everettian usage.
inary. That, however, is a statement about the experi-
ence’s meaning and interpretation, not its existence. The
experience as it is exists, period. It is what it is. Like
the biblical burning bush, each experience declares, “I am
that I am.” Most likely in the present example, the expe-
rience will be a little piece of the universe isolated, on its
own, and of no great consequence. But one never knows
until all future plays out. Some lucky dreams have built
nations. Maybe the same is true of some lucky Higgs-
boson events. Most though, surely, will be of the more
minor fabric of existence. All in all, the world of the
empiricist is not a sparse world like the world of Dem-
ocritus (nothing but atom and void) or Einstein (nothing
but unchanging spacetime manifold equipped with this
or that field), but a world overflowingly full of variety—
a world whose details are beyond anything grammatical
(rule-bound) expression can articulate.
Yet this is no statement that physics should give up,
or that physics has no real role in coming to grips with
the world. It is only a statement that physics should
better understand its function. What is being aimed for
here finds its crispest, clearest contrast in a statement
Richard Feynman once made [122]:
If, in some cataclysm, all of scientific knowl-
edge were to be destroyed, and only one sen-
tence passed on to the next generation of
creatures, what statement would contain the
most information in the fewest words? I
believe it is the atomic hypothesis (or the
atomic fact) that all things are made of
atoms—little particles that move around in
perpetual motion, attracting each other when
they are a little distance apart, but repelling
upon being squeezed into one another. . . .
Everything is made of atoms. That is the key
hypothesis.
The issue for QBism hangs on the imagery that usually
lies behind the phrase “everything is made of.” William
James called it the great original sin of the rationalistic
mind [123]:
Let me give the name of ‘vicious abstraction-
ism’ to a way of using concepts which may be
thus described: We conceive a concrete situa-
tion by singling out some salient or important
feature in it, and classing it under that; then,
instead of adding to its previous characters
all the positive consequences which the new
way of conceiving it may bring, we proceed
to use our concept privatively; reducing the
originally rich phenomenon to the naked sug-
gestions of that name abstractly taken, treat-
ing it as a case of ‘nothing but’ that, concept,
and acting as if all the other characters from
out of which the concept is abstracted were
expunged. Abstraction, functioning in this
way, becomes a means of arrest far more than
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a means of advance in thought. It mutilates
things; it creates difficulties and finds impos-
sibilities; and more than half the trouble that
metaphysicians and logicians give themselves
over the paradoxes and dialectic puzzles of
the universe may, I am convinced, be traced
to this relatively simple source. The viciously
privative employment of abstract characters
and class names is, I am persuaded, one
of the great original sins of the rationalistic
mind.
What is being realized through QBism’s peculiar way of
looking at things is that physics actually can be done
without any accompanying vicious abstractionism. You
do physics as you have always done it, but you throw
away the idea “everything is made of [Essence X]” before
even starting.
Physics—in the right mindset—is not about identify-
ing the bricks with which nature is made, but about iden-
tifying what is common to the largest range of phenom-
ena it can get its hands on. The idea is not difficult
once one gets used to thinking in these terms. Carbon?
The old answer would go that it is nothing but a build-
ing block that combines with other elements according
to the following rules, blah, blah, blah. The new answer
is that carbon is a characteristic common to diamonds,
pencil leads, deoxyribonucleic acid, burnt pancakes, the
space between stars, the emissions of Ford pick-up trucks,
and so on—the list is as unending as the world is itself.
For, carbon is also a characteristic common to this dia-
mond and this diamond and this diamond and this. But
a flawless diamond and a purified zirconium crystal, no
matter how carefully crafted, have no such characteristic
in common: Carbon is not a universal characteristic of
all phenomena. The aim of physics is to find character-
istics that apply to as much of the world in its varied
fullness as possible. However, those common character-
istics are hardly what the world is made of—the world
instead is made of this and this and this. The world is
constructed of every particular there is and every way of
carving up every particular there is.
An unparalleled example of how physics operates in
such a world can be found by looking to Newton’s law
of universal gravitation. What did Newton really find?
Would he be considered a great physicist in this day when
every news magazine presents the most cherished goal of
physics to be a Theory of Everything? For the law of uni-
versal gravitation is hardly that! Instead, it merely says
that every body in the universe tries to accelerate ev-
ery other body toward itself at a rate proportional to its
own mass and inversely proportional to the squared dis-
tance between them. Beyond that, the law says nothing
else particular of objects, and it would have been a rare
thinker in Newton’s time, if any at all, who would have
imagined that all the complexities of the world could be
derived from that limited law. Yet there is no doubt that
Newton was one of the greatest physicists of all time. He
did not give a theory of everything, but a Theory of One
Aspect of Everything. And only the tiniest fraction of
physicists of any variety, much less the TOE-seeking va-
riety, have ever worn a badge of that more modest kind.
It is as H. C. von Baeyer wrote in one of his books [124],
Great revolutionaries don’t stop at half mea-
sures if they can go all the way. For Newton
this meant an almost unimaginable widen-
ing of the scope of his new-found law. Not
only Earth, Sun, and planets attract objects
in their vicinity, he conjectured, but all ob-
jects, no matter how large or small, attract
all other objects, no matter how far distant.
It was a proposition of almost reckless bold-
ness, and it changed the way we perceive the
world.
Finding a theory of “merely” one aspect of everything
is hardly something to be ashamed of: It is the loftiest
achievement physics can have in a living, breathing non-
reductionist world.
Which leads us back to Hilbert space. Quantum
theory—that user’s manual for decision-making agents
immersed in a world of some yet to be fully identified
character—makes a statement about the world to the ex-
tent that it identifies a quality common to all the world’s
pieces. QBism says the quantum state is not one of those
qualities. But of Hilbert spaces themselves, particularly
their distinguishing characteristic one from the other, di-
mension,29 QBism carries no such grudge. Dimension is
something one posits for a body or a piece of the world,
much like one posits a mass for it in the Newtonian the-
ory. Dimension is something a body holds all by itself,
regardless of what an agent thinks of it.
That this is so can be seen already from reasons inter-
nal to the theory. Just think of all the arguments rounded
up for making the case that quantum states should be in-
terpreted as of the character of Bayesian degrees of belief.
None of these work for Hilbert-space dimension. Take
one example, an old favorite—Einstein’s argument about
conditioning quantum states from afar. In Section V of
this paper we repeated the argument verbatim, but it is
relevant to note that before Einstein could write down his
ψ12, he would have had to associate some Hilbert spaces
H1 and H2 with S1 and S2 and take their tensor product
H1 ⊗ H2. Suppose the dimensionalities of these spaces
to be d1 and d2, respectively. The question is, is there
anything similar to Einstein’s argument for changing the
value of d2 from a distance? There isn’t. ψ2 may be
29 Hardy [125, 126] and Dakic´ and Brukner [127] are examples of
foundational efforts that also emphasize this quantum analogue
to what Eo¨tvo¨s tested on platinum and copper [128]. Hardy put
it this way in one of his axioms, “There exist systems for which
N = 1, 2, · · · , and, furthermore, all systems of dimension N , or
systems of higher dimension but where the state is constrained
to an N dimensional subspace, have the same properties.”
30
forced into this or that subspace by choosing the appro-
priate measurement on S1, but there is no question of
the whole Hilbert space H2 remaining intact. When it is
time to measure S2 itself, one will still have the full ar-
senal of quantum measurements appropriate to a Hilbert
space of dimension d2 to choose from—none of those fall
by the wayside. In Einstein’s terms, d2 is part of the
“real factual situation” of S2.
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The claim here is that quantum mechanics, when it
came into existence, implicitly recognized a previously
unnoticed capacity inherent in all matter—call it quan-
tum dimension. In one manifestation, it is the fuel upon
which quantum computation runs [128, 132]. In another
it is the raw irritability of a quantum system to being
eavesdropped upon [76, 133]. In Eqs. (19) and (20) it
was a measure of deviation from the Law of Total Proba-
bility induced by hypothetical thinking. And in a farther-
fetched scenario to which we will come back, its logarithm
might just manifest itself as the squared gravitational
mass of a Schwarzschild black hole [134, 135].
When quantum mechanics was discovered, something
was added to matter in our conception of it. Think of
the apple that inspired Newton to his law. With its dis-
covery the color, taste, and texture of the apple didn’t
disappear; the law of universal gravitation didn’t reduce
the apple privatively to just gravitational mass. Instead,
the apple was at least everything it was before, but af-
terward even more—for instance, it became known to
have something in common with the moon. A modern-
day Cavendish would be able to literally measure the
further attraction an apple imparts to a child already
hungry to pick it from the tree. So similarly with Hil-
bert-space dimension. Those diamonds we have already
used to illustrate the idea of nonreductionism, in very
careful conditions, could be used as components in a
quantum computer [136]. Diamonds have among their
many properties something not envisioned before quan-
tum mechanics—that they could be a source of relatively
accessible Hilbert space dimension and as such have this
much in common with any number of other proposed
30 Take a coin, and imagine flipping it. We generally write down a
(subjective) probability distribution over two outcomes to cap-
ture our degrees of belief of which way the flip will go. But
of course it is a judgement call that it can only go two ways.
Steven van Enk would say it could always land on its side; so
he would always write down a probability distribution over three
outcomes. If one takes (p0, p1) as a subjective assignment, the
number 2 is objective with respect to it: It is something we imag-
ine or hypothesize about the coin. If one takes the (p0, p1, p2)
as a subjective assignment, then the number 3 is objective with
respect to it: It will fall one of three ways regardless of what
we believe about which of the three ways it will fall. So ob-
jectivity/subjectivity comes in layers. We call something objec-
tive, and then make probability assignments in the subjective
layer above it. But of course, the first “calling something ob-
jective” has a personal element in itself. Recently, techniques
have started to become available to “test” the supposition of a
dimension against one’s broader mesh of beliefs; see [129–131].
implementations of quantum computing. Diamonds not
only have something in common with the moon, but now
with the ion-trap quantum-computer prototypes around
the world.
Diamondness is not something to be derived from
quantum mechanics. It is that quantum mechanics is
something we add to the repertoire of things we already
say of diamonds, to the things we do with them and
the ways we admire them. This is a very powerful re-
alization: For diamonds already valuable, become ever
more so as their qualities compound. And saying more
of them, not less of them as is the goal of all reduction-
ism, has the power to suggest all kinds of variations on
the theme. For instance, thinking in quantum mechan-
ical terms might suggest a technique for making “purer
diamonds”—though to an empiricist this phrase means
not at all what it means to a reductionist. It means that
these similar things called diamonds can suggest exotic
variations of the original objects with various pinpointed
properties this way or that. Purer diamond is not more of
what it already was in nature. It is a new species, with
traits of its parents to be sure, but nonetheless stand-
alone, like a new breed of dog.
To put it still differently, and now in the metaphor of
music, a jazz musician might declare that a tune once
heard thereafter plays its most crucial role as a substrate
for something new. It is the fleeting solid ground upon
which something new can be born. The nine tracks ti-
tled Salt Peanuts in CAF’s mp3 player31 are moments
of novelty in the universe never to be recreated. So of
diamonds, and so of all this quantum world. Or at least
that is the path QBism seems to indicate.32
To the reductionist, of course, this seems exactly back-
wards. But then, it is the reductionist who must live with
a seemingly infinite supply of conundrums arising from
quantum mechanics. It is the reductionist who must live
in a state of arrest, rather than moving on to the next
stage of physics. Take a problem that has been a large
theme of the quantum foundations meetings for the last
30 years. To put it in a commonly heard question, “Why
does the world look classical if it actually operates ac-
cording to quantum mechanics?” The touted mystery is
that we never “see” quantum superposition and entan-
glement in our everyday experience. But have you ever
seen a probability distribution sitting in front of you?
Probabilities in personalist Bayesianism are not the sorts
of things that can be seen; they are the things that are
thought. It is events that are seen.
The real issue is this. The expectation of the quantum-
to-classical transitionists33 is that quantum theory is at
the bottom of things, and “the classical world of our ex-
31 Charlie Parker, Dizzy Gillespie, Charlie Parker, Charlie Parker,
Charlie Parker, Joshua Redman, Miles Davis Quintet, Arturo
Sandoval, “The Quintet” (Massey Hall, 1953).
32 A nice logical argument for this can be found in [137].
33 See [138, 139] for particularly clear discussions of the subject.
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perience” is something to be derived out of it. QBism
says “No. Experience is neither classical nor quantum.
Experience is experience with a richness that classical
physics of any variety could not remotely grasp.” Quan-
tum mechanics is something put on top of raw, unre-
flected experience. It is additive to it, suggesting wholly
new types of experience, while never invalidating the old.
To the question, “Why has no one ever seen superpo-
sition or entanglement in diamond before?,” the QBist
replies: It is simply because before recent technologies
and very controlled conditions, as well as lots of refined
analysis and thinking, no one had ever mustered a mesh
of beliefs relevant to such a range of interactions (factual
and hypothetical) with diamonds. No one had ever been
in a position to adopt the extra normative constraints
required by the Born rule. For QBism, it is not the emer-
gence of classicality that needs to be explained, but the
emergence of our new ways of manipulating, controlling,
and interacting with matter that do.
In this sense, QBism declares the quantum-to-classical
research program unnecessary (and actually obstruc-
tive34) in a way not so dissimilar to the way Bohr’s 1913
model of the hydrogen atom declared another research
program unnecessary (and actually obstructive). Before
Bohr, everyone thought that the only thing that could
count as an explanation of the hydrogen atom’s stable
spectrum was a mechanical model. Bohr’s great genius
in comparison to all the other physicists of his day was in
being the first to say, “Enough! I shall not give a mech-
anistic explanation for these spectra we see. Here is a
way to think of them with no mechanism.” Researchers
had wasted years seeking an unfulfillable vision of the
world, and that certainly was an obstruction to science.
All is not lost, however, for the scores of decoherentists
this policy would unforgivingly unemploy. For it only
suggests that they redirect their work to the opposite
task. The thing that needs insight is not the quantum-
to-classical transition, but the classical-to-quantum! The
burning question for the QBist is how to model in
Hilbert-space terms the common sorts of measurements
we perform just by opening our eyes, cupping our ears,
and extending our fingers.
Take a professional baseball player watching a ball fly
toward him: He puts his whole life into when and how he
should swing his bat. But what does this mean in terms
of the immense Hilbert space a quantum theoretical de-
scription would associate with the ball? Surely the player
has an intuitive sense of both the instantaneous position
and instantaneous momentum of the baseball before he
lays his swing into it—that’s what “keeping his eye on the
34 Without an ontic understanding of quantum states, quantum
operations, and unitary time evolutions—all of which QBism re-
jects [2, 5, 37]—how can the project even get off the ground? As
one can ask of the Big Bang, “What banged?,” the QBist must
ask, “In those days of the world before agents using quantum
theory, what decohered?”
ball” means. Indeed it is from this intuition that New-
ton was able to lay down his laws of classical mechanics.
Yet, what can it mean to say this given quantum theory’s
prohibition of simultaneously measuring complementary
observables? It means that whatever the baseball player
is measuring, it ain’t that—it ain’t position and momen-
tum as usually written in operator terms. Instead, a
quantum model of what he is doing would be some inter-
esting, far-from-extremal single POVM—perhaps even
one that takes into account some information that does
not properly live within the formal structure of quan-
tum theory (the larger arena that Howard Barnum calls
“meaty quantum physics” [140]). For instance, that an
eigenvector |i〉 of some Hermitian operator, though iden-
tically orthogonal to fellow eigenvectors |j〉 and |k〉 in
the Hilbert-space sense, might be closer in meaning to
|k〉 than to |j〉 for some issue at hand.
So the question becomes how to take a given common-
day measurement procedure and add to it a consistent
quantum description? The original procedure was stand
alone—it can live without a quantum description of it—
but if one wants to move it to a new level or new direction,
having added a consistent quantum description will be
most helpful to those ends. Work along these lines is
nascent, but already some excellent examples exist [141].
Of course, unconsciously it is what has been happening
since the founding days of quantum mechanics. Here, we
find an affinity with a comment of John Stuart Bell, one
buried in a letter to Rudolf Peierls and almost lost to
physics history [10]:
I have the impression as I write this, that a
moment ago I heard the bell of the tea trol-
ley. But I am not sure because I was concen-
trating on what I was writing. [. . .] The ideal
instantaneous measurements of the textbooks
are not precisely realized anywhere anytime,
and more or less realized, more or less all the
time, more or less everywhere.
QBism thinks of the textbook “ideal instantaneous mea-
surements” as on the same continuum as listening for the
tea trolley. But what POVM elements should one write
for the latter? Only time, actively spent in new research,
will tell.
The important question is how matter can be coaxed
to do new things. It is in the ways the world yields to
our desires, and the ways it refuses to, that we learn the
depths of its character.
I give you an object of this much gravita-
tional mass. What can you do with it?
What can you not? And when you are
not about, what does it cause?
I give you an object of this much quantum
dimension. What can you do with it?
What can you not? And when you are
not about, what does it cause?
If taken seriously what do these questions imply by
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their very existence? That they should have meaning-
ful answers! Here is one example. A knee-jerk reaction
in many physicists upon hearing these things is to de-
clare that dimension as a capacity collapses to a triviality
as soon as it is spoken. “All real-world systems possess
infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. And it doesn’t take
quantum field theory to be completely correct to make
that true; a simple one-dimensional harmonic oscillator
will do. It has an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.”
But maybe not. Maybe no real-world quantum system
has that much oomph. Just as one can treat the Earth’s
inertial mass as infinite for many a freshman mechanics
problem, or a heat bath as infinite for many a thermody-
namical one, maybe this is all that has ever been going on
with infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. It is a useful ar-
tifice when a problem can be economically handled with
a differential equation. (Ask Schro¨dinger.) It is worth
noting that when the algebraists set about making a rig-
orous statement of what a quantum field theory ought
to be, they seem only to be able to make progress by
imposing a postulate that says, roughly, “In a QFT, the
states that are localized in space and bounded in energy
form a finite-dimensional space” [142].
And with this, we come to nearly the farthest edge of
QBism. It is the beginning of a place where quantum
mechanics must step past itself. To make quantum di-
mension meaningful in ontic terms, as a quality common
to all physical objects, is to say it should be finite—going
up, going down from this object to the next, but always
finite. Every region of space where electromagnetism can
propagate, finite. Every region of space where there is a
gravitational “field,” finite.
It means that despite its humble roots in nonrelativis-
tic quantum mechanics, there is something already cos-
mological about QBism. It tinkers with spacetime, say-
ing that in every “hole” (every bounded region) there is
an interiority not given by the rest of the universe and a
common quality called dimension. It says that there is
probably something right about the “holographic princi-
ples” arising from other reaches of physics [143]. Recog-
nizing entropy as a personal concept (entropy is a func-
tion of probability), QBism would suspect that it is not
an entropy bound that arises from these principles, but
perhaps a dimension bound [8, 128].
Invocations of a “holographic principle” in quantum
gravity research traditionally contain a statement along
the lines of, “The information in a volume actually lives
on its boundary.” These locutions grow more opaque the
more closely they are studied. To talk of the “degrees
of freedom existing on the boundary” is to trap oneself
within obsolete intuitions. Fundamentally, probabilities
do not exist without a gambler, and likewise, “informa-
tion” does not exist without an agent concerned with
communication and computation. (The latter statement
is the logarithm of the former.) Two orthogonal quantum
states for a system are not two distinct physical config-
urations, in the sense of classical physics. Rather, they
are two maximally distinct hypotheses for its possible fu-
ture behavior consequent upon an agent’s action. Alice’s
quantum state for a system—whether a benzene ring or a
black hole—does not live on the system’s boundary, nor
in its bulk. It lives in Alice’s mesh of beliefs, along with
all her other fears and aspirations.
A novel perspective requires new images and
metaphors, which can in turn stimulate novel technical
developments. How do we distance ourselves from the
language that Hilbert-space dimension quantifies “the
number of distinct states a system can be in”? For this
mode of thought is at the root of all the loose talk in
trying to interpret those holographic principles.
Suppose that Alice has access to a localized physical
phenomenon that she wishes to employ in a quantum
communication scheme. Her goal is to detect, as well
as possible, whether her communique´s are being eaves-
dropped upon. A technical result from a few years ago in-
dicates that the maximal achievable sensitivity to eaves-
dropping is a simple function of the Hilbert-space dimen-
sion [76]. (In fact, a SIC furnishes a set of states that
saturates this bound.) If we take the holographic prin-
ciple to say that the maximal Hilbert-space dimension
of a phenomenon grows with the area that bounds it,
then we have a relation between optimal “sensitivity to
the touch” and a boundary area. Indeed, sensitivity be-
ing tied to boundary area is an appealing image: For the
boundary is the only thing an agent can touch in the first
place!
X. QUANTUM COSMOLOGY FROM THE
INSIDE
Theodore Roosevelt’s decision to build the Panama
Canal shows that free will moves mountains, which
implies, by general relativity, that even the curva-
ture of space is not determined. The stage is still
being built while the show goes on.
— John Conway and Simon Kochen [55]
Let us, however, step back from that farthest edge for
a moment and discuss cosmology as it is presently con-
strued before taking a final leap!
Sometimes it is claimed that a point of view about
quantum theory like QBism’s would make the enquiries
of quantum cosmology impossible. For instance, David
Deutsch once wrote [144]:
The best physical reason for adopting the Ev-
erett interpretation lies in quantum cosmol-
ogy. There one tries to apply quantum the-
ory to the universe as a whole, considering
the universe as a dynamical object starting
with a big bang, evolving to form galaxies and
so on. Then when one tries, for example by
looking in a textbook, to ask what the sym-
bols in the quantum theory mean, how does
one use the wave function of the universe and
the other mathematical objects that quantum
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FIG. 8: Quantum Cosmology from the Inside. The agent
in Figure 1 can consider measurements on ever larger sys-
tems. There is nothing in quantum mechanics to bar the sys-
tems considered from being larger and larger, to the point of
eventually surrounding the agent. Pushed far enough, this is
quantum cosmology! Why all this insistence on thinking that
“an agent must be outside the system he measures” in the cos-
mological context should mean “outside the physical universe
itself”? It means outside the system of interest, and that is
the large-scale universe. Nor is there any issue of self-reference
at hand. One would be hard pressed to find a cosmologist who
wants to include his beliefs about how the beats of his heart
correlate with the sidereal cycles in his quantum-state assign-
ment for the external universe. The symbol |Ψuniverse 〉 refers
to the green boxes alone.
theory employs to describe reality? One reads
there, ‘The meaning of these mathematical
objects is as follows: first consider an observer
outside the quantum system under consider-
ation . . . .’ And immediately one has to stop
short. Postulating an outside observer is all
very well when we’re talking about a labora-
tory: we can imagine an observer sitting out-
side the experimental apparatus looking at it,
but when the experimental apparatus—the
object being described by quantum theory—
is the entire universe, it’s logically inconsis-
tent to imagine an observer sitting outside it.
Therefore the standard interpretation fails. It
fails completely to describe quantum cosmol-
ogy. Even if we knew how to write down the
theory of quantum cosmology, which is quite
hard incidentally, we literally wouldn’t know
what the symbols meant under any interpre-
tation other than the Everett interpretation.
But this is nonsense. It is not hard to imagine how to
measure the universe as a whole: You simply live in it.
What are the typical observables and predictables of
cosmology? The Hubble constant, the cosmological con-
stant, the degree of inhomogeneity of the cosmic mi-
crowave background radiation, total baryon number in
this or that era of the universe, perhaps others. To do
quantum cosmology is to ask how an application of quan-
tum mechanics can be made with regard to these quan-
tities. For the QBist quantum theory would be used as
it always is: As a normative calculus of consistency for
all probability assignments concerned. Quantum theory
advises an agent to make all his probability assignments
derivable from a single quantum state. Write it like this
if you wish—a big, fat wave function (it’s for the whole
universe after all):
|Ψuniverse 〉. (36)
Why not? We are swimming in this ocean called the
universe, and we have to do physics from inside of it.
But then all the rest of the universe is outside each of
us. This wave function represents an agent’s catalogue
of beliefs for the relevant things outside.35
The only point here is that QBism has every bit as
much right to do cosmology as any other interpretation
of quantum mechanics. The only difference is that QBism
does it from the inside.
More exciting is the possibility that once it does all
that (its own version of what the other interpretations
might have done), its power may not be exhausted. For,
noting how the Big Bang itself is a moment of creation
with some resemblance to every individual quantum mea-
surement, one starts to wonder whether even it “might
be on the inside.” Certainly QBism has creation going
on all the time and everywhere; quantum measurement
is just about an agent hitching a ride and partaking in
that ubiquitous process.
At the end of a long article it doesn’t hurt to speculate.
We let William James and John Archibald Wheeler do
the work for us. First more sweepingly [145],
Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem
to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are
the parts of the world to which we are closest,
35 There is one issue with assigning a state vector |Ψuniverse 〉. One
doesn’t even write down a pure quantum state for laser light
when its phase is unknown; a mixed state is more appropriate
[67]. It is hard to imagine why one would write down a pure state
for the large-scale universe. Who would have beliefs that strict
of it? Be that as it may, a pure state is certainly allowed in prin-
ciple. Even people with the most unreasonable of initial beliefs
(from an outsider’s perspective) want to gamble consistently.
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the parts of which our knowledge is the most
intimate and complete. Why should we not
take them at their facevalue? Why may they
not be the actual turning-places and growing-
places which they seem to be, of the world—
why not the workshop of being, where we
catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may
the world grow in any other kind of way than
this?
Irrational! we are told. How can new being
come in local spots and patches which add
themselves or stay away at random, indepen-
dently of the rest? There must be a reason
for our acts, and where in the last resort can
any reason be looked for save in the material
pressure or the logical compulsion of the total
nature of the world? There can be but one
real agent of growth, or seeming growth, any-
where, and that agent is the integral world
itself. It may grow all-over, if growth there
be, but that single parts should grow per se
is irrational.
But if one talks of rationality—and of rea-
sons for things, and insists that they can’t
just come in spots, what kind of a reason
can there ultimately be why anything should
come at all?
Then, more modernly [39],
Each elementary quantum phenomenon is an
elementary act of “fact creation.” That is
incontestable. But is that the only mecha-
nism needed to create all that is? Is what
took place at the big bang the consequence
of billions upon billions of these elementary
processes, these elementary “acts of observer-
participancy,” these quantum phenomena?
Have we had the mechanism of creation be-
fore our eyes all this time without recognizing
the truth? That is the larger question implicit
in your comment [“Is the big bang here?”].
When cosmology hails from the inside, the world stands
a chance of being anything it wants to be.
XI. THE FUTURE
It is difficult to escape asking a challenging ques-
tion. Is the entirety of existence, rather than being
built on particles or fields of force or multidimen-
sional geometry, built upon billions upon billions
of elementary quantum phenomena, those elemen-
tary acts of “observer-participancy,” those most
ethereal of all the entities that have been forced
upon us by the progress of science?
— John Archibald Wheeler
Imagine our universe at a time when there were no
agents about to use the laws of probability theory as an
aid in their gambles—i.e., before the cruel creativity of
Darwinian selection had brought forth any such agents.
Were there any quantum states in the universe then?
We QBists say No. It’s not a matter of the quantum
state of the universe waiting until a qualified PhD stu-
dent came along before having its first collapse, as John
Bell joked, but that there simply weren’t any quantum
states. Indeed, though we know little about elsewhere
under Heaven, here on Earth there weren’t any quantum
states until 1926 when Erwin Schro¨dinger wrote the first
one down. The reason is simple: The universe is made of
something else than ψ-flavored gelatin. But then, what of
the Born rule? To this, in contrast, a QBist would say,
“Aha, now there’s a sensible question.” For the Born
rule is among the set of relations an agent should strive
to attain in his larger mesh of probability assignments.
That normative rule indicates the character of the nat-
ural world, a character that is present even when there
are no agents to make use of it. As Craig Callender once
paraphrased it, in QBism, it is the normative rule which
is nature’s whisper, not the specific terms within it.
Any of us can use quantum theory, but you can only
use it for yourself. By way of analogy, consider the single-
celled organisms called Euglena. These are “flagellate
protists”—microbes with tails coming off of them. The
tail arose from evolutionary pressures, so that a Euglena
can move from environments where there are depleted
nutrients to environments where there’s an abundance of
nutrients. It’s a tool. Quantum mechanics is like the
Euglena’s tail. It’s something we evolved in the 1920s,
and since it’s been shown to be such a good tool, we
keep using it and we pass it on to our children. The
tail of a Euglena is a single-user tail. But we can look
at the tail and ask, “What might we learn about the
environment by studying the tail’s structure?” We might
notice the tail is not completely circular, and that might
tell us something about the viscosity of the medium the
Euglena travels through. We might look at the ratio
of the length of it to the width of it in various places,
and that might tell us about features of the microbial
environment. Likewise, quantum mechanics is a single-
user theory, but by dissecting it, we can learn something
about the world that all of us are immersed in.
In this way, QBism is carrying out what Einstein called
the program of the real [146]:
A basic conceptual distinction, which is a
necessary prerequisite of scientific and pre-
scientific thinking, is the distinction between
“sense-impressions” (and the recollection of
such) on the one hand and mere ideas on the
other. There is no such thing as a concep-
tual definition of this distinction (aside from
circular definitions, i.e., of such as make a
hidden use of the object to be defined). Nor
can it be maintained that at the base of this
distinction there is a type of evidence, such
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as underlies, for example, the distinction be-
tween red and blue. Yet, one needs this dis-
tinction in order to be able to overcome solip-
sism. Solution: we shall make use of this dis-
tinction unconcerned with the reproach that,
in doing so, we are guilty of the metaphysi-
cal “original sin.” We regard the distinction
as a category which we use in order that we
might the better find our way in the world of
immediate sensations. The “sense” and the
justification of this distinction lies simply in
this achievement. But this is only a first step.
We represent the sense-impressions as condi-
tioned by an “objective” and by a “subjec-
tive” factor. For this conceptual distinction
there also is no logical-philosophical justifica-
tion. But if we reject it, we cannot escape
solipsism. It is also the presupposition of ev-
ery kind of physical thinking. Here too, the
only justification lies in its usefulness. We are
here concerned with “categories” or schemes
of thought, the selection of which is, in prin-
ciple, entirely open to us and whose quali-
fication can only be judged by the degree to
which its use contributes to making the total-
ity of the contents of consciousness “intelligi-
ble.” The above mentioned “objective factor”
is the totality of such concepts and conceptual
relations as are thought of as independent of
experience, viz., of perceptions. So long as we
move within the thus programmatically fixed
sphere of thought we are thinking physically.
Insofar as physical thinking justifies itself, in
the more than once indicated sense, by its
ability to grasp experiences intellectually, we
regard it as “knowledge of the real.”
After what has been said, the “real” in
physics is to be taken as a type of program,
to which we are, however, not forced to cling
a priori.
There is so much still to do with the physics of QBism,
and this article has just started scratching the surface.
Just one example: The technical problems with SICs are
manifest. For instance, there must be a reason a proof
of their existence has been so recalcitrant. An optimist
would say it is because they reach so deeply into the core
of what the quantum is telling us! In any case, we do sus-
pect that when we get the structure of SICs down pat,
Eq. (20), though already so essential to QBism’s distilla-
tion of quantum theory’s message, will seem like child’s
play in comparison to the vistas the further knowledge
will open up.
But the technical also complements and motivates the
conceptual. So far we have only given the faintest hint of
how QBism should be mounted onto a larger empiricism.
It will be noticed that QBism has been quite generous
in treating agents as physical objects when needed. “I
contemplate you as an agent when discussing your expe-
rience, but I contemplate you as a physical system before
me when discussing my own.” Our solution to “Wigner’s
friend” is the great example of this. Precisely because of
this, however, QBism knows that its story cannot end as
a story of gambling agents—that is only where it starts.
Agency, for sure, is not a derivable concept as the reduc-
tionists and vicious abstractionists would have it, but
QBism, like all of science, should strive for a Coperni-
can principle whenever possible. We have learned so far
from quantum theory that before an agent the world is
really malleable and ready through their intercourse to
give birth. Why would it not be so for every two parts
of the world? And this newly defined valence, quantum
dimension, might it not be a measure of a system’s po-
tential for creation when it comes into relationship with
those other parts?
In this article, we have focused on what QBism has
to say about small quantum systems. This is, in part,
an example of QBism showing its ancestry in quan-
tum information theory. But, as the science journalist
James Burke once said, the revolutionary ideal admits no
half-measures: The lessons of QBism must apply more
broadly than qubits and qutrits. What does taking the
principles of QBism on board mean for how one thinks
about special relativity [7]? What about the practice
of renormalization in statistical physics and field the-
ory [147]? Or classical probability, information theory
and machine learning [148, 149]? The study of SICs
has already changed the shape of the boundary between
physics and pure mathematics [95, 104, 106]. How far
must the changes go? What, we might even ask, do Jame-
sian pragmatism, empiricism and radical metaphysical
pluralism mean for the nature of mathematical truth?
It is a large research program whose outline is just tak-
ing shape. It hints of a world, a pluriverse, that consists
of an all-pervading “pure experience,” as William James
called it.36 Expanding this notion, making it technical,
and letting its insights tinker with spacetime itself is the
better part of future work. Quantum states, QBism de-
clares, are not the stuff of the world, but quantum mea-
surement might be. Might a one-day future Shakespeare
write with honesty,
Our revels are now ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and
Are melted into air, into thin air skip . . .
We are such stuff as
quantum measurement is made on.
36 Aside from James’s originals [114, 117], further reading on this
concept and related subjects can be found in Refs. [150–156].
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